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I INTRODUCTION
Property is considered to be a characteristic of western civilization, and one of high
importance in the common law system. This concept goes well together with open market
economy, free trade and individual rights. Property however, can be tangible such as land,
or it can be intangible or better known as intellectual property. The need to distinguish
between these two forms of property is vital for us, as not to mix the theories intended for
one and apply it to the other. Legal protection for intellectual property did not evolve at
the same time with that for tangibles. ' Moreover, tangible property can occupy only one
place at a designated time. Thus, the physical possession of tangibles is exclusive.^
Whereas, intellectual property which is composed of information does not enjoy the
exclusionary character distinguishing tangibles. The differences underlying these two
forms of property must thereforE reflect on to the legal provisions regulating them. Hence
we must understand the reasons for protecting intellectual property as an independent
form and consequently observe the extent of protection needed.
The reasons for legal protection of intellectual property take the shape of
philosophical perspectives that justify the protection based on several theories. The
principle basis for protection of intellectual property and in particular copyright varies
between the legal systems even among the western hemisphere. The dominant basis are of
two main approaches:
(1) the individualistic European approach; under which the protection of the creation is a
natural right expressed in the concept of an author's right (droit d'auteur) which in a pure
' Robert P. Merges et al.. Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age
,
(forthcoming 1997)
(manuscript at 1, on file with author).
^Id.
2natural law theory is absolute and not subject to limitation, yet the same cannot be said in
practice. The nations of mainland Europe are followers of the natural rights approach
(2) the commercial Englo-American approach; under which the protection of a creation is
expressed in the form of economic incentive granting the creator a right to copy The
English-speaking countries adopt this approach.
The United States Constitution in its copyright clause certifies the latter approach. The
clause states that Congress shall have the power "to promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries."^ The United States Supreme Court has also
established the utilitarian economic approach in its decisions. ** Despite all of this, there are
groups working constantly to modify this approach. These opponents of the economic
incentive theory in America have launched a ferocious attack on the economic analysis
and seek to pave the way for a natural right approach to come through.^ Publishers, while
known to be sincere fans to the natural law theory, have struggled for a prevail of a
natural rights perspective since the end of censorship in 1694 when the House of
Commons of England refused to renew the licensing act of 1662 ending with it the
Stationers' Company's monopoly in the book trade. ^ Since then, the publishers have
^ Edward W. Ploman & L. Clark Hamilton, Copyright 26 (1980).
'Id.
^ U.S. Const, art. I, section 8 cl. 8.
^ See, e^. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219. reh'g denied . 347 U.S. 949 (1954). (establishing that "the
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copynghts is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best wa\ to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in Science and useful Arts"): Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios. Inc .. 464 U.S. 417. 429. reh'g denied , 465 U.S. 1112(1984),
(stating that " the limited grant is a means by which "); United States v. Paramount Pictures .
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("copyright law makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration").
See, e.g
., Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law; Copyright as Labor and Possession . 51 Ohio St.
L.J. 517 (1990); The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory . 10 Cardoza Arts & Entertaiimient
L.J. 423 (1992) [hereinafter Yen II]; Robert E. Hathaway II. American Law Analogues to the Paternity
Element of the Doctrine of Moral Right: Is the Creative Artist in America Really Protected? 30
Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 121 1983: Phyllis Amamick, American Recognition of the Moral Right:
Issues and Options 29 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 30 (1983).
* L. Ray Patterson. Copyright in Histoncal Perspective, 139 (1968).
3repeatedly attempted to regain their monopoly.^ The publishers in their efforts to do so
hid behind the moral rights of authors and pleaded the welfare of writers. Their loyalty to
the natural law theory has never been one of ideological interest. To them natural law
means less limitation on property rights and as a result more profits. It is the flow of cash
that the publishers are after not the victory of a theory over another For the publishers as
an industry, it is not surprising to witness their efforts pour into this cause. What is
alarming however is the rising voices of some scholars calling against the economics
approach and the need to "restore" natural law theory in American Copyright. The
motivations for these efforts seem rather vague and fail to serve any cause other than that
of the publishers as I will demonstrate. The consequences of giving weight to natural law
more than the copyright law could handle would be undesirable. The United States
Copyright Act of 1976*° is not a moral right based copyright. More importantly, natural
law concepts are not compatible with the provisions and limitations of the 1976 act.
Among these limitations is the fair use doctrine^' incorporated in the act.'^ The history
underiying the development of copyright protection in the United States varies from that
of mainland European countries. While the stress in America was concentrated on the
public welfare and protection of the author's interest as a means for promoting the
interests of the public,'^ the philosophy in "droit d'auteur" countries was concentrated on
the personal right of the author.'"*
Copyright law is to strike a balance between the interests of the authors on one hand,
and those of the pubHc on the other. Judge Mansfield wrote: "...we must take care to
guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have
^ Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession , 51 Ohio St. L.J. 517,
526 (1990).
17U.S.C. SI
" See infra Part.
'° U.S.C.ss 101-803.
'M7U.S.Csl07.
'^ U. S. Const, art. I, s. 8, cl. 8.
'" Stephen M. Stewart, International Copyright and Neighboring Rights 19 (1983).
4employed their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labor: the other, that the
world may not be derived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts to be retarded."'^
If we were to view this balance in a more basic sense, we would be left with the natural
right of the author on one hand, and fair use on the other. From this standpoint we begin
this study by studying the two extremes.
Hence, we must understand the difference in each system, and the circumstances in
which each law developed so as to understand the concept and the scope of 'fair use'.
First I will refer to notions of Natural law, study the moral aspects embodied in copyright
laws of the world and then explore the arguments drawn by the adherents to the natural
law theory and finally examine 'fair use' in American and continental laws.
'^
Sayrev. Moore
.
102 Eng. Rep. 139 n.. 140 n. (K.B. 1785), quoted in. Michael D. Brittin,
Constitutional Fair Use . 28 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP), 141, 154 (1982).
II THE NATURAL LAW THEORY
A. History
The natural law theory originated in the Roman era.'^ Romans had three different kinds
of laws/^ jus gentium or the law of Nations which applied to other societies than Romans
whom were governed by jus civile or civil law and jus naturale or natural law which was
common to all because it reflected the nature of things. Roman natural law was a set of
legal rules reflecting the reality and facts of life.
Occupatio or the principle of occupancy was a major form of acquiring ownership in
things under Roman law. According to this principle, title to property was given to the
person who first took possession of that property.'^ The limitations on this principle can
be seen as a clear example of how Roman natural law reflects facts of life. Simply they are
the things that are impossible to possess by nature, such as, the sky or the sea.
B. Development of Natural Law
Natural law as described above is no longer as basic in our times where claims of
moral supremacy have become a significant characteristic. '^ Philosophers including John
Locke, Francis Hutcheson, Hugo Crrotius and others spoke of natural law in a moral
concept.
'^ Yen. supra note 9, at 522.
'^
Id. at n. 27.
'* Id. at 522.
"Id.
^° A profound English philosopher whose contribution in developing the natural law theory is well
recognized. See John Locke. Two Treatises on Civil Government (1690). 203-16 (Henry Marley ed.
1884)(bk.II).
^' Francis Hutcheson. A Short Introduction To Moral Philosophy (1747), reprinted in Collected Works
(Hildsheim: 01ms, 1969); A System of Moral Philosophy (1755). reprinted in Collected Works
(Hildsheim; 01ms. 1969).
^' De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (1625), trans. F. W. Kelsey (New York; Oceana Publications, 1964).
1 . John Locke
John Locke's theory of natural law gives the labor of man a foundation for property/"
Although it was real property that Locke's theory was pointing at,^'' nevertheless,
intellectual property has been dealt with in a Lockean perspective.
Locke assumes that people have a natural right of property in their bodies, and since
they owned their bodies, and in turn the labor of their bodies, they were entitled to the
fruits of that labor.^^ Further Locke talks about the exclusionary benefit of that labor, yet
it is important to know that he restricts that right to the extent that there is still enough for
the public. ^^ Thus, it is evident that Locke's theory of property evolves around a man's
right to appropriate the fruits that earth produces, which god enabled for all humans, and
Locke sees that a labor or an effort by one human to appropriate from those fruits entitles
him to that fruit as long as he takes his share. This reasoning of Locke reflects the laws of
23
Locke, supra note 20.
^^ This is clear from his words:
[But I shall endeavor to show how men might come to have propert>^ in several parts
of that which god gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact
of all the commoners God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also
given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience.
Id. at 204.
^^ [Tjhough the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a
property in his own "person". This nobody has any right to but himself. The "labor" of
his body and the "work" of his hands, we may say are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he
removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mi.xed his labor
with it, and joined to it something that is his own and thereby makes it his property..
Id. at 204.
"For this "labor" being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man can but he have a right to
what that is once joined to. at least where is enough, as good as left in common for others " Id. The
same law of Nature that does by this means give us property, does also bound that property too." Id. at
206. "As many as much one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may
by his labor fix his property in. Whatever is beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others."
Id.
7nature; for it is a necessity of life that man is entitled to property, because if appropriation
of the fruits by his labor was subject to approval of all those in the public, man would not
have survived.
^^
Thus, Locke's theory is as clear as water can be. Locke did not talk about a right to
monopolize, rather, he spoke of a right of nature, to own.
2. The Natural Law in the Eighteenth Century
Natural law transformed from the "simple reflection of nature's status quo to the legal
vindication of a person's natural rights"^^ in the eighteenth century. In other words,
natural law changed from reflecting the laws of nature to justifying an individual's right in
a moral concept.
It can be said that the Eighteenth century natural law was a combination of both, the
Roman natural law, and the theories of philosophers such as John Locke. As a result the
natural law saw property as a person's moral right in the fruit of her labor subject to the
Roman doctrine of limitations, such as, capability of possession. '^^
C. Natural Law: A Justification for Copyright
The theories of natural law in the line of property have developed to become a
justification for property rights and consequently for copyright. In accordance with this
justification, authors would be entitled to reap the fruits of the work they created, to be
rewarded for their efforts and contribution to the public and the right to protect the
integrity of their creations as extensions of their personality.^^ The latter right along with
the right of the author to control their works is well evident in the many copyright laws of
the world.
"And will any one say he had no right to those acorns or apples he thus appropriated because he had
not the consent of mankind to make them his?... If such a consent as that was necessary, man had
starved." Id. at 205.
'^ Yen, supra note 9, at 523.
^'Id.
^° Craig Joyce et al.. Copyright Law 15 (3rd ed. 1994).
III. THE MAJOR SYSTEMS OF COPYRIGHT
There are two major systems of copyright in the wodd. ' The first, is the droit
d'auteur' or continental European system which is dominant in mainland Europe The
second is the Anglo-Saxon or 'copyright' system adopted by the English-speaking
countries. Perhaps the most distinguishing variation between these two major systems is
the emphasis each system focuses on.'^^ Thus, we will study the two systems and point out
the emphasis of each system.
A. The Continental System (Droit d'Aueteur Countries).
This is the system dominant in mainland Europe.^" This system takes the individualistic
approach, relating the right in the work to the personality of the author which produced
the act of personal creation.^'* The justification for copyright under this system is based on
the principle of natural justice. Thus, the author is the creator of his work which is an
expression of his personality. Accordingly, the work would be an extension to the
author's personality and thus it is protected meaning that the author can control the work
by deciding whether it be published or not, and by protecting the integrity of the work
from mutilation or abuse. The author owns the fruit of his labor and accordingly the
royalties he is paid are wages for his labor.
The 'droit d'auteur' concept was bom during the French Revolution"*^ in 1789, which
abolished the system of privileges granted by the King to printers and others A decree in
^' Originally, there were three systems, the Anglo-Saxon, the continental European and the socialist
system. However, due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the eastern camp, the
latter system has become a vanishing one, and its importance has diminished to a great extent.
Therefore, I will restrict my study to the first two systems.
^^ Stewart, supra note 14, at 6.
^^ Ploman & Hamilton, supra note 3, at 26.
34
Stewart, supra note 14. at 6.
Stewart, supra note 14, at 7.
91791 declared that the most personal of all properties is the work which is the fruit of a
writer's mind/^ and another in 1793 gave the authors an exclusive right of reproduction.^
The State Council (Conseiller d'Etat) analyzed the concept of 'droit d'auteur' and
determined the two essential characteristics of ownership as
(1) "a right enforceable erga omnes (an absolute right);
(2) an exclusive right over a work of the intellect."
After the French Revolution, other countries as the Latin (Italy), Iberian (Spain and
Portugal) and Latin American countries adopted this system. ^*^ The Germanic (Germany,
Switzerland and Italy) and Scandinavian countries adopted this system as well, but not in
its pure form. As opposed to France the pioneer of the continental system, moral rights in
the latter countries are not perpetual, but rather terminate fifty years after the death of the
author.'"
The continental system has distinguishable characteristics:
(a) Copyright is a natural right, and is absolute and not subject to restrictions,"*' meaning
that the right is perpetual. However, this is only true in theory, while the practice in
countries of the continental system has restricted the term of copyright protection, and has
imposed limitations on the rights of the author. As a result these limitations, most notably
those forming the fair use concept, come as an exception to the author's rights which are
the principle. Therefore, the 'fair use' in the continental system, as an exception, will
inevitably be narrower than 'fair use' in the Anglo-Saxon system.
(b) The laws of the continental system protecting literary and artistic works, govern the
relationship between authors and publishers. The Copyright acts in
^^Id. at 326-27.
^^Id. at 327.
^«Id.
''Id. at 7.
^° See infra part III. A. 3.
"' Stewart supra note 14, at 6.
10
the'droitd'auteur'countries regulate the contracts between these two parties, protecting
the authors as considered the weaker party in the relation.
(c) Restrictions on authors, such as, compulsory licenses are acceptable only in very
limited circumstances.
'*^
(d) 'Droit d'auteur' can only originate in an individual because it is an individual right
Therefore, a company, particularly in the movie industry, has to acquire all the rights from
the individual authors.''^
(e) Most importantly, and because copyright is a natural right, moral rights (droit moral)
occupy a paramount place in the continental system. The moral right in the laws of this
system is inalienable and cannot be assigned, but rather, it is related to the person of the
creator, so as to protect the author against commercial pressures seeking to make the
author waive this right.
This last characteristic of the continental system, that speaking of moral rights, is of
great importance to this study as it represents the dividing line between fair use in the two
major systems. Moral rights are not per se "anti fair use", however, moral rights are a
reflection of the natural right in this system; where the principle of ownership is perpetual
and unlimited, and where the exception to that principle is limited duration and fair use.
1. France.
In France, the system of privileges was established in the sixteenth century, giving the
privileged publisher the exclusive right to print. The first germs of moral attributes were
found in the decree of Louis XVI granting the author because of his creation, an exclusive
right in perpetuity.'*^ The privileges were abolished by the Revolution in 1789 and
principles of the present copyright law were laid down. One of these principles was the
personal right of the author as a proprietor of his work.''^ The French copyright law'*^ is a
''Id. at 7.
^^Id.
^^Id. at 19.
^^Id.
11
leading law in the field of moral rights. The first article of this law cleariy shows the moral
concept incorporated in the French law. It defines the incorporeal right by which an
author of a work enjoys attributes of an intellectual and moral nature as well as of an
economic nature."*^ A separate chapter under this law is provided for moral rights ** These
rights consist of, a right of respect"*^ under which the author can assert a cause of action
against a transferee who modifies his work or presents it in a disparaging light, ^"^ a right of
disclosure^' and a right to withdraw his work even after it has been published. Another
article provides for inalienable rights for authors of graphic and three-dimensional works
^^ Law on the Intellectual Property Code, Law No. 92-597 of July L 1992. J. O.. July 3. 1992 (as last
amended by laws Nos. 94-361 of May 10, 1994, and 95-4 of January 3, 1995). J.6. May 11, 1994,
January 4. 1995.
""'
ITjhe author of a work of the mind shall enjoy m that work, by the mere fact of its
creation, an exclusive incorporeal property right which shall be enforceable against
all persons. This right shall include attributes of an intellectual and moral nature as
also attributes of an economic nature, as determined by books I and III of this code.
The existence or conclusion of a contract for hire or of service by the author of a
work of the mind shall in no way derogate from the enjoyment of the right afforded
by the first paragraph above.
Intellectual Property Code art. L. 1 1 l-I (Ft.).
'* Art. L. 121-1- L. I2I-9(Fr.).
'^^ [A]n author shall enjoy the right to respect for his name, his authorship and his work.
This right shall attach to his person. It shall be perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible.
It may be transmitted mortis causa to the heirs of the author. Exercise may be conferred
on another person under the provisions of a will.
Art. L. 121-1 (Fr.).
^° Intellectual Property World Desk Reference: A Guide to Practice by Country. State and Province
(Thomas M.S. Hemnes et al. eds., at France-3 1992).
"The author alone shall have the right to divulge his work. He shall determine the method of disclosure
and shall fix the conditions thereof.."
Art. L. 121-2 (Fr.).,
[N]otwithstanding assignment of his right of exploitation, the author shall enjoy a right to
reconsider or of withdrawal, even after publication of his work, with respect to the assignee.
However, he may only exercise that right on the condition that he indemnify the assignee
beforehand for any prejudice the reconsideration or withdrawal may cause him.
Art. L. 121-4 (Fr.).
12
to share in the proceeds of any sale even if the work had been transferred The moral
rights under the French law are perpetual.
2. Italy
The Italian Law for the Protection of Copyright and Other Rights with the Exercise
Thereof^^ provides for moral rights to authors as well. These rights as stated in article 22
are related to the person of the author and therefore inalienable Article 20 of this law
grants the author the right to claim authorship of the work and object to any mutilation,
distortion, or modification that would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation However,
modification of architectural works necessary in the course of construction, is exempted
fi-om this provision. Article 23 states that these rights are perpetual and pass on to the
heirs of the author. Article 21 ensures the authors of anonymous and pseudonymous
works the right to reveal their identity. Article 142 gives the author the right to withdraw
his work from commerce whenever serious moral reasons arise. The latter right is subject
to reimbursement to the affected party and notification of the transferee of the right in the
work and the ministry involved.
3. Germany.
Germany is a country where authors were very much concerned with moral rights. ^^
What is peculiar about Germany is the history underlying its copyright law Although
Germany, as like other European countries which were influenced by the Enlightment in
England and the Natural Rights School which had spread throughout the continent after
the French revolution, yet its political formation consisting of a large number of
principalities was an obstacle for copyright protection. The system of privileges existed
" Art. L. 122-8 (Ft).
Art. L. 121-1 (Ft.) "It shall be perpetual, inalienable and imprescrptible". id.
" Law No. 633 of April 22, 1941, Gazzetta Ufficiale, July 16, 1941, (as last amended July 29, 1981,
Gazzetta Ufficiale August 1. 1981).
^^ Stewart, supra note 14, at 16.
6 German Industrial Property, Copyright and Antitrust Laws 140 (Fiedrich Karl Beier et al. eds.. 2nd
ed. 1989).
13
until the birth of the German Empire ('Reich') in the late nineteenth century. Under this
system, an author wanting to protect his work throughout the German land, had to secure
privileges from all the municipalities. For one German poet, the well-known Goethe, the
number of privileges mounted up to 39.^^ This example demonstrates the weak protection
authors enjoyed until the mid-nineteenth century when reciprocity between German states
on the protection of privileges was setforth in the Alliance of 1832.^^ The first German
copyright law was then promulgated in 1871 under the German Empire. ^°
Moral rights are ensured protection not only by the copyright law, but also by the
constitution which guarantees human dignity and personal freedom.''^ Thus, the moral
concept is adopted by the constitution in Germany. The Act Dealing with Copyright and
Related Rights^^ protects the author in his personal and intellectual relation to his work, as
well as in the utilization of the work.^^ The moral rights are contained in articles 12-14 of
the Act. These rights are the right of disclosure and publication; the right to claim
authorship or to remain anonymous; the right to protect the work from distortion or
mutilation and to take action against acts that would be prejudicial to the author's interest
in the work. Article 25 grants the author of an artistic work, other than architectural
works and applied art, the right to participate in the profit of any subsequent sale of such
article through an art dealer or auctioneer.
4 The Berne Convention.
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works also
recognizes moral rights. The "droit moral"^'* found in article 6bis provides for a paternity
^* Stewart, supra note 14, at 18.
''Id.
''Id.
Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 1. para. 1 (F.R.G.).
Act of September 9, 1965, Bundesgesetzblatt . I, No. 5 September 16. 1965, p. 1273. (as last amended
1993).
"Art. 11(F.R.G.).
^ Art. 6 bis(l) Berne Convention (Paris text, 1971).
14
right which guarantees the author an inalienable right to claim authorship, or to disclaim it
when the work has been modified in a way that the author does not approve, or to prevent
the use of his name by someone else in connection with that other person's work The
convention also permits the author to "object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation. "^^ The term of protection for moral rights shall be
maintained after the death of the author and at least after the expiry of the economic
rights. ^^ However, the convention allows for the duration of the moral rights to be ceased
after the death of the author in countries whose legislation does not provide for protection
after the death of the author.^^ Thus, the convention onJy provides for two kinds of moral
rights; a paternity right and a right of integrity. The right of publication is not within the
moral rights of the convention.
5. Tunisia
With respect to developing countries, Tunisia is one of which its copyright law is
considered as a model law on copyright for developing countries. ^^ The Tunisian Law on
Literary and Artistic Property^^ provides for moral rights in the same context as that of the
French law. Article 9 of the Tunisian law lays down the moral rights an author enjoys. ^*^
^^ See 1 Howard B. Abrams, The Law of Copyright, s 1.021A] (1991).
^ Art. 6bis(2) Berne Convention.
^* Stewart, supra note 14, at 84.
^^ Law No. 94-36 of February 24, 1994. J.O.. March 1. 1994.
lA]uthors' moral rights shall include, in particular:
(a) a right of authorship: this right implies that an author shall maintain the right to
claim authorship of his work and to have his name given on each copy;
(b) a right of non-authorship: this is the author's right to remain anonymous at the
time his work is made available to the public;
(c) a right to assume a pseudonym: an author shall enjoy the right to assume a
pseudonym in place of his own name;
(d) a right to oppose any modification or distortion or mutilation of his work;
(e) the right of disclosure: by virtue of this right the author alone shall be entitled to
15
These rights include the right to claim authorship, to remain anonymous, to assume a
pseudonym, to protect the work from any modification or mutilation, to control the work
and the right to withdraw the work. The words of this article indicate that the enumerated
moral rights are not exhaustive.^' Article 25, similar to another in the French law, provides
for an inalienable right for the authors of manuscripts and of three-dimensional works.
This right gives these authors a share in any sale of the work through an auction or dealer
even if the rights in that work had been assigned. ^^ Thus, the first sale doctrine does not
exist in this instance.
6. Jordan
A somewhat lesser degree but nonetheless relatively strong concept of moral rights is
provided for in the Jordanian Law on the Protection of Copyright of 1992. ' Article 8 of
this law gives the author the right of attribution, disclosure, modification and to prevent
the work from mutilation, distortion, or any other modification. The right to withdraw the
work, however, is subject to the existence of serious and legitimate reasons, and provided
the author pays fair compensation to the person whom the economic rights have passed.
Article 29 gives the author of three-dimensional art or musical core, the right to share
in the proceeds of any sale of that work by auction subsequent to the first sale effected by
the author.
B. The Anglo-Saxon System (Copyright Countries).
This system finds its origin in the Statute of Queen Anne of 1709 in the United
Kingdom. This system grants the author the right to copy his work and the right to
present his work to the public by means or process;
(f) a right to reconsider: an author shall enjoy the right to withdraw his work from
circulation or to seize it.
Art. 9 (Tunis).
"Id.
'^Art. 25 (Tunis).
^^ Law No. 22 of April 16, 1992.
16
prevent others from reproducing the work without his authorization This system is
dominant in England, the United States and the English-speaking countries/''' The
justification for copyright under this system is based on the economic argument Thus,
works would be created if there is a reasonable expectation of recouping and earning a
reasonable profit from the creations achieving the goal of this philosophy in making the
works available for the public7^ This argument justifies creations as a result of the
incentive given to authors in exclusive copying. The philosophy of this system, is that
absent a protection for authors, a copyist (infringer) will get a free ride from the work of
the creator, and the creator will as a result, have no incentive to create, and thus the
public interest would be jeopardized by depriving the public from benefiting of the
creation. This philosophy did not have any trouble in considering artificial persons, such
as, companies, particularly those in the movie industry, as authors. ^^
The 'public interest theory', which prevailed in Britain can be seen more clearly in the
field of Patents. English Patents were granted not only to inventors but also to persons
who brought an invention from abroad and introduced its manufacture in to England. ^^
The reason for this was to stimulate more investment and benefit the public wealth. As we
can see from the forgoing, the Anglo-Saxon system was concerned more with the public
interest than with the rights of the author.
1. England
In England, the Copyright Statute^^ contains four moral rights. These rights however
are subject to limitations and do not all endure as long as the economic rights. These
rights can also be waived, which is something not possible under the laws of the
continental system.
'"^ Ploman & Hamilton, supra note 3. at
.
^^ Stewart supra note 14, at 3.
'* Stewart supra note 14, at 8.
" Merges et. al., supra note 1, at Chap. Ill, 3.
^^ Copynght, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 (U.K.).
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Article 77 of the English statute contains the right to be identified as author or
director. Article 78 stipulates that the right in article 77 must be asserted by the author or
director. This leads that the right to claim authorship is not effective until it has been
asserted according to the provisions specified in article 78. Article 79 enumerates a
laundry list of exceptions to the right to claim authorship whereby this right does not
apply.
The right to protect the integrity of the work is found in article 80 which grants the
right to object to any derogatory treatment of a work. Treatment is defined not to
encompass translations/^ nor to include an arrangement or transcription of a work not
involving more than a change of key or register.^" The treatment is said to be derogatory if
it amounts to distortion or mutilation of the work or is otherwise prejudicial to the author
or director. ^' The right to protect the integrity of the work is also subject to a list of
exceptions enumerated in article 81 whereby this right does not apply. This right is also
subject to article 82 which lays down the qualifications of the right that determine the
requirements needed for this right to be applicable.
A third moral right in the English law is the right to privacy of certain photographs and
films. This right is also subject to specified exceptions^"* These three moral rights last
until the expiry of the economic rights which is generally 50 years of life of the author.*'*
The fourth moral right is the right of false attribution in article 84. A person has a right
not to have a work falsely attributed to him as author or director. This right endures only
twenty years after the person's death. *^ Strangely enough, this right is usually within the
right to claim authorship, yet the English law treats it as a separate right.
'^ Art. 80(2(a)(i) (U.K.).
*° Art. 80(2)(a)(ii) (U.K.).
^' Art. 80(2)(b) (U.K.).
^^ Art. 85 (U.K.).
^^ Art. 85(2)(a)-(e) (U.K.).
^^ Art. 86(1) (U.K.).
^^ Art. 86(2)(U.K.).
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These are the moral rights in the United Kingdom Copyright Statute with their
exceptions. These rights as opposed to laws of the 'droit d'auteur' countries can be
waived with the consent of the author.
2. The United States
The United States Copyright Act of 1976^^ is very limited in granting moral rights to
authors. The 1990 Visual Artists Rights Amendment to the Copyright Act of 1976 gives
the author of a visual work the right of attribution and integrity These rights give the
author the right to claim authorship of her work, and to prevent the use of her name to
any visual work in such a way that would be prejudicial to her honor or reputation.**^ It is
^^ Art. 87 (U.K.).
*' 17 U.S.C. ss 101-803 (as amended through January 1, 1994).
*^ [Rjights of Attribution and Integrity. Subject to section 107 and independent of the
exclusive rights provided in section 106, the author of a work of visual art -
(l)shall have the right-
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which
he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of her name as the author of the work
of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 1 13(d), shall have the nght -
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that
work that would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that nght, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or
grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that nght.
17 U.S.C. s 106A(a). *^ Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988.
*^ 17 U.S.C. ss 101-803 (as amended through January 1, 1994).
[R]ights of Attribution and Integrity. Subject to section 107 and independent of the
exclusive rights provided in section 106, the author of a work of visual art -
(l)shall have the right-
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which
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worthy to note that these rights are subject to the fair use doctrine in section 107,**** are
limited to the author and cannot be assigned^ and are not perpetual '^' Other than that,
once an author has transferred ownership of the copyright of his work, under United
States Copyright law, the transferee is entitled to reproduce, adapt and modify the work.
The author having received remuneration for the transfer of the copyright cannot control
the way his work is being used by the transferee. Section 109 of the Copyright Act gives
the owner of a copy of a copyrighted work the right to resell or even destroy the work,
thus, the owner has complete control over it.^^
The forgoing illustrates the "extra-limited" scope of moral rights in American
Copyright law, which takes a minimal approach to satisfy the requirements of, and
adherence to the Berne Convention. " Professor Ray Patterson explains that the
jurisprudencial problem with moral rights in the United States is that American
jurisprudence view copyright as an economic property right. The moral right however, is a
personal right. Thus courts will be reluctant to enforce a moral right overriding a property
right.
he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of her name as the author of the work
of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 1 13(d). shall have the right -
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that
work that would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or
grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.
Id.
17U.S.C. s 106A(b), (e).
17 U.S.C. s 106A(d).
17 U.S.C. s 109(a).
Joyce, supra note 30, at 611.
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Thus, moral rights vary from one country to another in their importance Further on,
we will examine the scope of fair use in the laws of the foregoing countries, and observe
the relationship between these two fields in copyright law.
C. Proponents of a Natural Law Copyright
A number of scholars have called for the need to "restore" the natural law theory in
American Copyright.'"* These proponents of natural law support their position by
attacking the economic incentive theory as a justification for copyright, and highlighting
the influence of Locke's theory of property on American law. The supporters of natural
law in copyright have concluded that natural law is necessary, and "suppression" of
concepts of fairness and justice in copyright jurisprudence is unjustified.
Below I will discuss these arguments and upon that we will determine whether there is
a need to expand the influence of natural law in the American Copyright law and observe
to what extent, if any, must the natural rights of authors be considered to balance the
interests of authors and those of the public, and to maintain the order of social and
cultural life.''
L The Early American Argument:
One of the arguments shared by the proponents is rested on history, contending that
early Americans viewed copyright in both economical and natural law perspectives. In
''' See , supra note 7.
^^ See
, e.g ., Yen II, supra note 7. at 433, (contending that constructing a Copyright regime solely on
economics is likely to fail); Amamick, supra note 7, at 35 (arguing that financial encouragement and
dissemination are not sufficient to secure the interests of artists and society), Hathaway II, supra note 7,
at 154 (advocating that "one advantage of providing for an author's moral rights by adding a personal
rights section to the Copyright Act of 1 976 is the uniform and comprehensive protection that such a
national statute could ensure") id.
Yen, supra note 7, at 429 (quoting James Madison's support for the constitutional grant to enact
copyright legislation); Hathaway II, supra note 7, at 155 (suggesting that recognition of moral rights
would "reaffirm the national policy of promotion and preservation of creative works") id.
^' Yen, supra note 7, at 424.
Ploman & Hamilton, supra note 3, at 1. (The authors view copyright as a legal mechanism for the order
of social and cultiiral life and as a reconcile to the interests of authors and members of the public).
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support of this argument, they refer to state copyright statutes which, in their preambles,
contained natural law justifications for copyright, and in particular the New Hampshire
statute. ^^ For this argument, it only seems natural for these statutes to contain natural law
implications as common law was to a great degree inspired by natural law concepts. ' On
the other hand, the fact is that these statutes were preempted and it is with no use to argue
with a law that no longer exists. The question of preemption has been answered by section
301 of the Copyright Act of 1976^°^ where a statutory scheme was enacted to prevent
contradictory laws or judicial doctrines fi^om affecting the federal act. The 1976 Act
specifically represents the preemption of all state laws. As opposed to the 1909 Act under
which unpublished works were not covered by the federal statute but was protected by
state law, the current act extends the protection to encompass unpublished works. ^"^^ This
leaves with no doubt that the intention of Congress in enacting the 1 976 act was to create
a uniform federal system that would deal with the issues of copyright on a nation-wide
level and replace any other system. The legislative history of the 1976 act is in harmony
with this finding. The congressional report in this matter states that "the intention of
section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights under the common law or statutes of a
State that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to works coming within the scope
^^ Yen II, supra note 7, at 428.
^^ Yen, supra note 7, at 53 1.
[0]n or after January 1, 1978. all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works
of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after the
date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter.
no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common
law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C.s 301(a)
102
17 U.S.C. s 102(a). "Copyright protection subsists. ... in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed..."
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of the Federal copyright law".'°'^ Affirming this view, was the decision of the Supreme
Court in Wheaton v. Peters'"'' when the court rejected common law copyright claims, and
it held that the federal copyright statute was the only relief for the plaintiff '"^ The
proponents also apply the "early American argument" to the framers of the constitution
and reflect that to Madison's words supporting the constitutional grant.
Surprisingly, the proponents even support this argument by reference to the copyright
clause. '°^ In this instant, Alfred Yen argues that although the copyright clause supports
economic visions, yet it does not eliminate natural law from copyright jurisprudence '"^
He argues that Congress, under the copyright clause, is not empowered to create a new
right, but rather, to secure a "preexisting" right. For this argument, I shall recall that the
copyright clause is a constitutional grant. The "grant" did not come to affirm the common
law copyright, but rather was a new provision with distinguishable limitations'*^^ that did
not exist before. Had the copyright clause intend to affirm the "preexisting" rights, there
would not have been limitations in the clause. The legislative history of the Copyright Act
of 1 909 is our guidance in this matter. '°^ To the extreme of this argument, we find who
'°^ H.R. Rep. No. 1476. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1976). S. Rep. No. 473. 94th Cong.. 1st Sess. 114
(1975).
'°''33U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
'"'
Id. at 663. '°^ 17 U.S.C. s 102(a). "Copyright protection subsists, ... in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed..."
105
H.R. Rep. No. 1476. 94th Cong.. 2d Sess. 130 (1976). S. Rep. No. 473. 94th Cong.. 1st Sess. 114
(1975).
'°^ 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
'^^ Yen, supra note 7, at n. 91 and accompanying text.
"^^Id.
U.S. Const, art. I, s 8, cl. 8. "Congress shall have the power ... by securing for limited times, to authors
and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
'°' See H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong.. 2d Sess. 7 (1909):
[T]he enactment of copyright legislation ... is not based upon any natural right that the
author has in his writings. ... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors
for limited periods the exclusive right to their writings. The Constitution does not establish
copyrights, but provides that Congress shall have the power to grant such power if it thinks best.
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even deny the existence of a common law copyright.'"' The argument of the latter is that
both the English and American common law had never recognized common law copyright
only in a very limited way and later on overruled by the House of Lords of England in
Donaldson v. Becket and by the Supreme Court of the United States in Wheaton v.
Peters . '" The former, was an overruling of Millar v. Taylor .'
Millar involved a publisher whose rights had expired by the term provided in the
Statute of Anne. Millar, the publisher argued that despite the said fact, he still owned
common law rights in the work at issue. The court ruled in favor of Millar relying on the
moral rights of the author."^ This judgment, which proponents consider their basis for
Englo-American copyright justified by natural law, was overruled five years later in
Donaldson ."'* In the American courts, the famous Wheaton v. Peters," involved a case
whereby the plaintiff sought action against the defendant arguing an inherent natural right
that the defendant allegedly infringed."*' The Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs argument
and ruled for Peters.
Thus, the "early American" argument fails to establish a basis for natural law as a
justification for American copyright.
2. The Fairness and Justice Argument:
The proponents in another effort in trying to fit-in the natural law theory in American
jurisprudence, resort to decisions of the Supreme Court. They contend that the Supreme
Court has ruled in cases in favor of fairness and justice; that it would be unfair to deny
Id.
'"^
1 Howard B. Abrams, The Law of Copyright, at s 1.02{C]|2]; The Historic Foundation of American
Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright , 29 Wayne L. Rev. 1119, 1129-1185
(1983).
'"Id.
"^98Eng. Rep. 201 (1769).
"^ Id. at 252.
"^
I Eng. Rep. 837 (1774).
"^33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
"'Id. at 652.
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protection for a work whereby an author has contributed effort in creating the work.
They conclude that copyright's roots in fairness and justice can be witnessed in the
adoption of concepts owing their origin to natural law. One of these concepts is the
idea/expression dichotomy.
This argument is misleading. For one, we must distinguish between what is original"^
and protected by the copyright law, and what is not. Then we will read into the rulings the
proponents rely on.
Copyright protects original independent works of an author that demonstrate a
minimal degree of creativity. How can it not while the Constitution grants Congress the
right to enable protection for the progress of science and useful arts.'''' The terms
"authors" and "writings" presuppose a degree of originality. '^° Thus, originality becomes
a constitutional requirement'^' as well, not only a requirement imposed by the copyright
act. This requirement cannot in any way represent support for the proponents. For the
doctrine of idea/expression dichotomy dictates that an idea, system, procedure, process,
concept, principle, discovery and method of operation cannot be protected by
Copyright. '^^ Only the expression can be protected unless it becomes inseparable from the
idea.^^^ Therefore, an argument presiding on notions of fairness and justice, or what is
better known as the "sweat of the brow" doctrine to protect an idea by copyright is
deemed to fail. A similar argument relying on fairness and justice in protecting labor
consisting of mere facts is also likely to fail. The famous case of Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. laid down a clear rule that "originality not 'sweat
"' Yen II, supra note 7, at 429.
"* Originality is a requirement of the Copyright law. "Copyright subsists... in original works of
authorship..." 17 U.S.C. s 102(a) (1976).
"^U.S. Const, art. I, s 8, cl. 8.
'^° Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 1 1 1 U.S. 53 (1884).
'^' Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Serv.s, Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
'^M7U.S.C.s 102(b) (1976).
'^^ Baker V. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).(The "merger" doctrine).
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of the brow' is the touchstone of copyright protection in directories and other fact-based
works."'^'* The court, in denying protection for white-page directories, established that the
coordination, selection and arrangement of those directories "lack the minimum
constitutional standards for copyright protection." '^^ The court concluded that "copyright
rewards originality, not effort". '^'^ This ruling is a clear rejection of granting protection for
works based on fairness and or "sweat of the brow" unless the works are original. Thus,
the argument of fairness and justice has no legal standing in the Copyright Act.
The proponents then quote statements of the Supreme court containing fairness and
justice justifications for protection. '^^ One of these quoted cases is Mazer v. Stein'^^
which involved copyrighted statuettes being sold as lamp bases. The petitioners argued
and questioned the validity of the copyright when the work has been put in mass
production. '^^ The court held that the statuettes involved are copyrightable according to
the legislative history of the 1909 act and to the practice of the copyright office. '^"^ The
court concluded the industrial use does not bar copyright to works of art. '^'
It is clear fi-om the mentioned above that the court did not allow copyright for a work
based on mere labor. The work in this case is copyrightable and contains the requirements
of the Copyright Act. Thus, quoting statements without the surrounding facts can be
illusive and misleading.
In other cases, the proponents tend to interpret decisions in a manner that would
support their argument. The case of Bleistein v. Donaldson LithoRraphing Co. '^^ is one
'^' Feist, at 359-60.
'"
Id. at 362.
"'Id. at 363.
'^^ See, e^.. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). ("Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve reward commensurate with the services rendered.").
'^Id.
'^^
Id. at 204-205.
"°
Id. at 212-14.
'"Id. at 217.
'^^ 188 U.S. 239(1903).
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example of this misinterpretation. This case addressed the copyrightability of poster
advertisements. The decision which answered affirmatively, was concerned with
censorship because "it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
ITT
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations " " This
statement was interpreted to allow protection fi-om works resulting fi-om the intellectual
labor. '^'*. Others have considered this decision as a recognition of the personality
justification/^^ portraying the decision as shifting the standard of originality fi^om
judgment of society to the personal judgment of the author. ^^^ Whatever interpretations
given, the fact is that the work was protected whether it was artistically poor in the eyes
of others or not. This judgment did not allow protection for personality reasons, nor for
reasons of labor and sweat, but rather because denying protection on the basis of lack of
art would render a judgment courts are not in position nor qualified to render
It is obvious that the arguments in the line of fairness and justice are not convincing,
and lack accurate support. The requirement of originality negates any claim of protection
based on mere labor and sweat.
3. The Inadequacy of the Economic Theory Argument:
It has been argued that the economic incentive theory is insufficient to justify
production of certain works. ^'^^ In this context, the economic analysis falls short in
justifying protection for unpublished works and works that otherwise would have been
produced without any economic incentive, such as, academic works.
This argument at first glance, appears sound and bears some logic However, one
needs to note in the beginning, that the economic incentive theory is not the objective of
'"Id. at 251.
'^"^ Yen, supra note 7, at 533.
'" Justin Hughes, The philosophy of Intellectual Property
.
77 Geo. L.J. 287, 351-52 (1988).
'^^
Id. at 352.
Yen, supra note 7, at 537; Amamick supra note 7, at 81 (criticizing the protection of moral rights in
the United States as inadequate).
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the Copyright Act. Congress's goal was not to adopt and implement the economic theory,
but rather, it was a proper mechanism and means to achieve the designated purpose in
promoting science and useful arts.
The 1976 Act extended protection to unpublished works so long they met the
requirements of originality and fixation. ^^^ This was necessary to create a uniform act
regulating original works of authorship. It is also coherent with the federal preemption
provision'^' which preempted state laws protecting unpublished works with rights
equivalent to the exclusive rights of the Act.
One economic justification for unpublished works would be allowing the authors of
such a work to retain the economic value in that work until she chooses to exploit the
value. While others have given the privacy right argument a justification for protection of
these works/"*" a Fifth Circuit decision draws an interesting understanding of the Act in
this matter. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that "not every work that
qualifies for copyright protection must promote progress in 'Science' and 'useful arts'. It
is sufficient if the overall legislative scheme promotes that goal."'"*' This understanding of
the Act makes the economic analysis adequate for the Act as a whole and thus, does not
lie short in justifying protection for specified works.
Claiming that a natural law theory will be adequate to justify certain kinds of works
will result in expanding the monopoly of rights to the author. The subject matter of
copyright should not be the guiding factor in designating the scope of the monopoly, and
therefore a reason for expanding it Only the copyright clause in the Constitution should
be the deciding factor with the limitations mentioned within.
'^^ 17 U.S.C.s 102(a) (1976).
'^M7U.S.C.s 301 (1976).
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See Hughes, supra note 135, at 355.
"" Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F. 2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979).
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4. The Berne Convention Argument:
The last argument advocated as a reason for a natural law based copyright law in
America is the Berne Convention argument. The United States has become a member of
the Berne Convention effective March 1, 1989. through the Berne Convention
Implementation Act ("BCIA").''*^ The proponents argue that United States" adherence to
the Berne Convention is a recognition of moral rights and natural law justification in the
Copyright Act.
'''^
For this argument, we must remember that the Berne Convention was founded
between countries with the two ideologies of copyright; France representing the 'droit
d'autuer' countries, and the United Kingdom representing the copyright system.'"^
Therefore, the convention would more or less be categorized as a compromise between
the two major systems, thus adherence to the convention would not indicate adherence to
the French system. The United States joined the convention by applying the provisions of
the "Berne Convention Works" and its membership was not self-executing. Therefore, the
BCIA was adopted with minimum standards of the recent revised Paris Text of 1971.*'*^
The United States did not even adopt the moral rights setforth in Article 6bis of the
Convention but only to works of visual arts by enacting the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990. This Act, if anything, affirms Congress' will not to cause major changes to the
Federal Copyright Act of 1976 through joining the convention. Moreover, international
cooperation has become inevitable in almost every line of trade. For a country like the
United States where copyrighted works generate a large surplus, such cooperation would
be in favor of the United States to reduce the impact of copyright piracy on American
"^ Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853. October 31. 1988.
'''^ Amamick, supra note 7. at 80. ("The fact that a moral right bill protecting visual artists has been
144
145
146
introduced to Congress indicates that the American analogues' to the moral rights are not adequate.").
Stewart, supra note 14. at 88.
Craig Joyce et. al.. Copyright Law-Statutory Supplement. 3d ed.. at 305 (1994).
Pub. L. 101-650, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) [ss 601-10].
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works'''^ Therefore, the importance of U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention stems
from the greater protection to American works especially computer software, rather than
reflecting from the changes that might occur to the Copyright statute which as mentioned
above are minimal.
5. Conclusion.
In conclusion, the system of copyright in the United States is flindamentally different
from that of mainland Europe, whereby the Natural Rights School influenced the
Copyright acts to a great degree. Since the American approach is a successful one, with
regard to the history and circumstances of copyright in America, and since works are
being created and produced without legislative obstacles, there is no need to modify the
existing system which can only as a whole function successfully.
This system with its characteristics is peculiar to the United States. The doctrines of
the United States Copyright Act are not compatible to foreign acts just the same as the
basis of natural rights in the latter are not compatible to the American law. Fair use in the
United States is peculiar to the American system. Any modification to the American
system will result in affecting the fair use doctrine. This inevitable nexus is a product of
the "public interest" theory. The economic incentive theory is in fact a mere mechanism
to achieve the interest of the public. Congress' power to promote the progress of science
and useful arts has and always been to benefit the public. Such a goal can only be achieved
with the existence of an appropriate fair use doctrine.
Carol Motvka, U.S Participation in the Berne Convention and High Technology , 39 Copyright L.
Symp. (ASCAP) 107, 109 (1992).
IV FAIR USE
A. Introduction
As copyright laws and statutes protecting literary and artistic works have granted
exclusive rights to authors, they have imposed limitations on these rights as well. These
limitations include various topics, such as, reproduction by libraries and archives,
secondary transmissions and exemptions of certain performances and displays. Yet the
broadest limitation of all and the most controversial one, particularly in the United States
as will be demonstrated, is the limitation of fair use.
The concept known as 'fair use' is that term used to describe uses of copyrighted
material that are not prohibited by the copyright law. This term is used commonly in the
United States and occupies a sophisticated and distinguished position in American
Copyright law. In other jurisdictions while the term 'fair use' is not recognized''*^, yet the
concept of fair use and the rules associated with this concept nevertheless exist.
Therefore, the term 'fair use' is not one of unitary and worldwide recognition. In Italy, the
term 'free utilization' is used to refer to what is known as fair use. In Germany, 'free use'
is analogous to fair use. In England although the term fair use can be easily associated
with its meaning, yet the current term used in that country is 'fair dealing' This term in
the 1911 Act replaced the preexisting fair use concept. '''^ In other jurisdictions,'^" there
lies no specific term to describe such a concept, but rather existing only in the form of
exemptions from the exclusive rights of authors in the copyright statutes.
The variance in the terms used to describe the fair use concept does not necessarily
reflect to the scope of the concept, at least in theory, as we move later on and explore fair
'''^e.g., France.
'"^ William F. Patry, 1 Copyright Law and Practice 718 n. 8 (1994).
'^°
e.g., France, Tunisia and Jordan.
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use in depth in this study, we will realize that the use of the term or the absence of such a
term, as in the case of France, does in fact reflect on to the scope of fair use and the
provisions regulating this field. Despite all that has been said and will be said, it would be
safe to say, generally speaking, that while the author is granted exclusive rights, she does
not enjoy exclusive rights to use her work/^* This is basically the premise where fair use
stands.
B. Fair Use Treatment in American and Continental Legislation
One problem a person faces when studying the concept of fair use in different
jurisdictions is the different categorization of limitations in each statute. That is, what may
be considered fair use in one country may fall into a specific exemption in another. To be
more precise, while some jurisdictions include reproduction of copies for library archival
purposes as part of the fair use concept,'" this permissible use falls under a separate
category of exemptions in the United States.'" For the purposes of this study, the uses
that fall within the fair use concept in the United States are those that are to be examined
in the laws of other countries so as to provide a sound comprehensive analysis.
The most distinctive characteristic distinguishing fair use in the United States from that
of other countries is the way fair use is incorporated into the statute. Fair use as specified
in section 107 in the United States Copyright Act'^'' does not provide for specific detail
for uses that are to be encompassed by this section. In other words, the Act did not
provide a laundry list of fair uses. The legislators sought to lay down the general scope
and purpose of fair use rather than enacting extensive provisions that specify enumerated
uses. The result was illustrative purposes as examples of uses that may be considered fair,
and guiding factors for the courts to apply in a fair use analysis. Congress explains this
'^'
Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted works , in 2 Studies on Copyright 781, 783 (Arthur Fischer ed.
1963).
'" Copyright Statute art. 68 (Italy).
'" 17U.S.C. sl08(1976).
'^' 17 U.S.C. 8 107(1976).
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with the need to keep the fair use doctrine posted and updated to the unlimited situations
that can arise, particulariy at a time where technology is ever-changing.'" This generality
in codifying fair use, given the reason for not "freezing" the doctrine indicates the
legislators' will to maintain a wide scope of fair use.
In the laws of other countries, generality is not the rule in fair use legislation. Most of
these countries have incorporated this concept into their laws by enacting specific
provisions concerning fair use. These provisions are often extensive and precise in an
effort to encompass all the possible uses of copyrighted material. These laws mention in
detail the conditions under which a use is permissible and enumerate limitatively, as
opposed to illustratively in the American law, the different classes of copyrighted works
that are subject to fair use.'^^ On the other hand, these specifications would appear rather
necessary in countries adopting the Civil Law system when noting that these jurisdictions
usually treat court decisions as non-binding explanatory rules. This fact would require the
statutes in such systems to be exhaustive so as to encompass the most amount of
circumstances and conditions that might arise in a fair use problem. This explains the
intricate extensive provisions of fair use found in these countries.
Below is a discussion of the different conditions of fair use and how they are treated in
different countries;
'
"
[T]he endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can rise [sic]
particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute. The bill endorses the
purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine, but there is no disposition to freeze the
doctrine in the statute, especially during a penod of rapid technological change. Beyond a
very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it,
the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.
H. R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, repnnted in , (1976) U. S. Cong., & Ad. News 5619,
5680, quoted in Richard A. Bernstein, Parody and Fair Use in Copyright Law . 3 1 Copyright L. Symp.
(ASCAP) 1, 14-15 (1984).
'^^ Latman, supra note 151, at 802.
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1. The Purpose of the Use
Whereas in the United States the purposes of fair use are not limited by indication of
the statute/" other nations specifically state the availability of fair use only for certain
purposes. Thus the purpose of the use in these countries must be one of those specified in
the statutes to qualify for fair use. In Germany as one example, reproduction of a single
copy of a work is permitted only for private use.'^^ These limitative purposes are indicated
in the statutes and they usually consist of education, scientific, criticism, news and review
and private purposes. ^^^ An interesting trend found in fair use legislation in most countries
is stipulation that the use is for non-profit purposes, thus almost always closing the door
for commercial uses. In the United States on the other hand, there is no non-profit
requirement to enjoy the fair use right. '^°
In terms of purpose, most copyright laws differentiate between each purpose by
applying different rules accordingly. In the United States, there are no special rules of fair
use provided for each purpose individually, rather any purpose which is found to be fair is
treated the same under the fair use section. ^^' In Germany however, a certain article is
specified for uses incorporated in collections for teaching or religious use.^^^ This article
provides that the collection should be intended by its nature exclusively for religious,
school, or instructional use. Not only the intention, but the law also requires that the
purpose be clearly stated in the collection. '^^
'"
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, ... for
158
purposes such as criticism, comment..." 17 U.S.C. s 107 (1976).
Art 53(1) (F.R.G.).
'^^
Latman, supra note 151. at 802.
^^ Campbell v. AcufF-Rose Music, Inc.. 510 U.S. 569, 583-84 (1994). ("Accordingly, the mere fact that
that a use is educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any more
than the commercial character of a use bars a finding of fairness") id.
'^'
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters.. 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985). ("the fact that an article
is news' and therefore is a productive use is simply one factor in a fair use analysis"), id.
'" Art. 46 (F.R.G.).
'"Id. at Art. 46(1).
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2. The Amount to be Used.
Another distinction in the law of fair use between the United States and other countries
is the amount of material taken. In the United States Copyright Act, the amount of
material taken, like the purpose, is only but a factor to be weighed in determining the
existence of fairness. In the United Kingdom, photocopying by educational establishments
of published works is limited by one percent of that work in a quarter of a year. '^'*
Another limitation on the amount in this law is that anthologies intended for educational
use must not incorporate more than two excerpts from copyrighted works of the same
author.^"
The amount of material permissible to be used in many continental laws is prescribed
explicitly. The provisions concerning this matter highlight the narrower scope of fair use
in these countries. These provisions vary in the degree limiting the amount of material
taken from a protected work to be freely used. The permissible amount varies according
to the purpose of the use. While the amount may rise to include reproduction of a work in
its entirety for personal uses,*^^ this amount may decline substantially when another
purpose is involved. In Germany for example, only small parts of a printed work is
permissible to be copied for teaching purposes. '^^
3. The Nature of the Original work.
With respect to the nature of the original work and whether it has been published or
not, the United States Copyright Act also treats this factor as one to be weighed in a fair
use analysis. Thus, there is no publication requirement for a finding of fair use in the
United States.
'^ Art. 36(2) (U.K.).
'"id. at art. 33(2).
^^ Art. L. 122-5(2) (Fr.); Art. 53(1) (F.R.G.).
'^'
Art. 53(3) (F.R.G.).
"the fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made
upon consideration of all the above factors" 17 U.S.C. s 107 (1992).
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In other jurisdictions, fair use may only take place upon published works. The Tunisian
Copyright statute endorses the publication requirement as a condition for permissible
use.'^^ The French law endorses the publication requirement as well.' " In Germany,
quotations from a protected work is only available when that work is "publicly
communicated".'^'
4. Acknowledgment.
There is also the acknowledgment requirement by some laws to the author whose
work has been appropriated. The United States Copyright Act does not impose this duty
on the side of the second user. In the United Kingdom sufficient acknowledgment is a
condition for using a work for the purpose of news reporting. '^^ The French copyright law
explicitly requires the name of the author and the source be clearly stated when using
short quotations in a work, or in press reviews, or when disseminating public speeches. '^^
In Italy, articles of current interest may be used provided an indication of the source and
the author be given.
'^"^
5. Knowledge of the Author.
With respect to knowledge of the original author, the United States statute neither
requires permission from the author for fair use to take place, nor do the applicable rules
change when a user fails to obtain permission or is denied permission before he uses a
protected work. The Supreme Court held that "being denied permission to use a work
does not weigh against a finding of fair use".'^^ In the United Kingdom, no consent is
required for fair dealing with a work.
'^^
"Quotations and borrowings from a work already lawfully made available to the public shall be
authorized on condition that they be compatible with fair practice..." Art. 11 (Tunis.).
Once a work has been disclosed, the author may not prohibit ..." Art. L. 122-5 (Ft.).
170 ct
'^' Art. 51 (F.R.G.).
'^^
Art. 30(2). (U.K.).
'"Art. L, 122-5(3) (Fr.).
'^' Art. 65 (Italy).
'" Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 n. 18 (1994).
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In Germany, press articles and broadcast commentaries are permissible to be
reproduced unless they contain a statement reserving rights. Thus an author in this
instance may prevent a second user from appropriating his work by reserving his right in
the work through a statement of reservation on that work. The consent of the author is a
requirement in Germany for reproduction of a program for data processing,' for
recording of public lectures, '^^ and for public performance of a published work provided
no commercial or gainful purpose is involved and an equitable remuneration is paid to the
author. '^^ Also in this context, when uses are incorporated in collections for religious,
school, or instructional use in accordance with article 46, the author of each work being
used has to be notified by a registered letter. '^"^ In the Jordanian Law on Copyright,
consent of the author is not a requirement for using a work. However, in one instance
involving reproduction of newspaper articles in other newspapers, the original newspaper
may prohibit such reproduction by an express notice of prohibition.'^' In the French Act,
no consent of the author is required by indication of the fair use article stating that "the
author may not prohibit... ",'^^ however reproduction (temporarily or permanently) of a
software program or translation, arrangement, or attraction thereof is subject to the
author's consent.
'^^
6. Moral Rights and Other Conditions.
Some fair uses are subject to the moral right of the author As we have learnt in the
preceding chapters, moral rights are not of high concern in American copyright. In the
continental laws, moral rights can be found to restrict the fair use concept In Germany for
"^Art. 49(1)(F.R.G.).
'" Art. 53(4) (F.R.G.).
'^*
Art. 53(5) (F.R.G.).
"^ Art. 52 (F.R.G.).
'^° Art. 46(3) (F.R.G.).
'^' Art. 18 (Jordan).
'^^
Art. L. 122-5 (Ft.).
'^^
Art. L. 122-6 (Ft.).
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example, concerning a provision permitting use of worlds for religious, school, or
instructional use, the legislator has made this use subject to the moral right of the
author.'^"* According to this restriction, an author may prohibit the use when his work no
longer reflects his views and he has revoked any licenses to which he had agreed upon
earlier.'''
Other conditions such as time restriction are imposed on fair use in some laws. These
time limits require the user to destroy the reproduced material after a period of time The
German statute requires visual or sound record uses in school broadcasts for instructional
purposes to be destroyed no later than the end of the school year following the
transmission. Otherwise, remuneration has to be paid to the author.
7 Remuneration.
Remuneration to authors and copyright owners is perhaps the most striking distinction
in fair use legislation between Anglo-Saxon and Continental jurisdictions. Remuneration
or the duty to pay levies is a concept recognized in the continental system. This concept is
based upon the harm caused to the economic exploitation right of the author and
competition thereof In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, the incentive to the author as a
justification for copyright is in the form of economic benefit the author receives fi'om his
work. This factor being the effect on the market of the copyrighted work is represented as
one weighing factor in a fair use analysis in the United States. In other words, fair use
does not affect the economic incentive of the author and therefore no royalties or levies
are required to be paid by a user. The continental system views copyright as a natural
right thus protecting the fruits of an author's labor is necessary to safeguard this right. In
terms of fair use, most continental laws presuppose harm to authors fi^om personal and
other uses and safeguard the author's rights through utilizing the system of remuneration.
'^^ Art. 46(5) (F.R.G.).
'''Id.
'*^ Art. 47(2) (F.R.G.).
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This system in continental jurisprudence is part of their fair use concept. The explanatory
statement in the German Copyright amendment of 1985 determines that the interests of
the public in unhindered access to protected works is not sufficient to do away with the
remuneration system. '^^ In the United States and the United Kingdom however, such a
system would contradict the fair concept where use of a work in a fair manner shall not
entitle any copyright owner of remuneration because no harm is directed to the owner
from such use.
The remuneration scheme most notably in French and German statutes is to
compensate authors and copyright owners from reproduction made for private and other
purposes. The most common of private or personal reproduction is home-video taping for
visual and sound works, and reprography*^^ for printed works. It would be impossible to
imagine copyright owners policing individuals' uses of their work. This is why continental
copyright statutes enacted the remuneration scheme. This scheme imposes a levy to be
paid by manufacturers and importers of appliances and mediums capable of recording
sound and visual works as well as printed works.
In France, the legislators found that imposing levies on copying mediums such as blank
tapes is more reasonable than levies on copying machines. '^^ Thus, the law in France
requires manufacturers or importers to pay levies on recording mediums they market in
France.
*'°
'^^ [Ajlthough considerauons of public interest directed towards unhindered access to literature
protected by copyright could be a justification for excluding the right to prohibit copying.
Such considerations are not sufficient as a rule to enable exemption from payment of
compensation to be granted. That could only be justified on public-interest grounds of quite
exceptional importance.
9 Commercial Laws of Europe (Eds. Luis Ten Kate & Neville March Hummings at 277) (1986).
Reprography is defined in the German statute to include photocopying as well as other processes
having the same effect. Art. 54(2) (F.R.G.).
'^^ Melville B. Nimmer &. Paul Edward Gelle. International Copyright Law and Practice, s 8 FRA-124
(1988).
'^Art.L. 311-4 (Fr).
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In Germany, obligation to pay remuneration for sound and visual work that may be
reproduced by recording of broadcasts or audio recording mediums or transfers is
imposed on manufacturers and importers of appliances and video or audio recording
mediums.'^' As for works that may be reproduced by reprography, no remuneration was
required for these uses until the copyright amendment of 1985. This distinction in
remuneration was made because at the time remuneration was established only tape
recorders were considered to be an easy means for wide-spread copying in households.
The legislator was not contemplating that photocopiers would become wide-spread
among private users. However, advanced technology in the field of reprography resulted
in larger quantities reproduced through reprography than what the legislator had
contemplated in the preceding act.'^^ In addition to that, a Supreme court decision
prohibited photocopies of protected works in quantities made by schools. ^^^ These facts
made the legislator encompass reproduction by reprography in the remuneration system.
The remuneration system is imposed on two different classes. First, manufacturers and
importers of appliances used for reprography must pay an equitable remuneration to the
designated collecting society of authors. '^'* Second, operators of appliances in educational
institutions, public libraries and any institution that has photocopiers available by payment
must pay remuneration.
This leaves with no doubt the great difference in fair use legislation between American
and continental laws. This is all the product of the different emphasis each system stresses.
As we have learnt, the continental system stresses the emphasis on the individualistic
approach and tilts in favor of the author in the copyright balance. Thus fair use provisions
under this system would inevitably be formed to achieve this purpose. Whereas in the
'' Art. 54(1) (F.R.G.).
'^^ Commercial Laws of Europe, supra note 187, at 274.
'^^ Judgment of April 14, 1978, GRUR.
'^^
Art. 54(2) (F.R.G.).
40
Anglo-Saxon system, the emphasis is on enhancing the public interest, thus a wide scope
of fair use is welcomed to flirther this interest.
C. The Nature of Fair Use
I. The Nature of Fair Use in the United States
a. The Justification of Fair Use
There is no definition of fair use provided by the legislators in the United States.
Instead, Congress decided to give a general guidance of fair use and allowed leeway for
the courts to examine fair use on a case-by-case analysis. Thus, commentators have
relied on the definition of fair use as "a privilege in others than the copyright owner of a
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent,
notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the copyright". '^^ However, this definition
might not be accurate in terms of defining fair use as a privilege. This definition follows
that fair use is an infHngement but nevertheless privileged. Justice Story however, in
Folsom V. Marsh, '^^ a case said to be the first to estabUsh the fair use doctrine, took a
different position. Justice Story argued that fair use is a justifiable use that the law
recognizes no infringement.'^^ Thus, two theoretical bases of fair use emerge to explain
the nature of fair use:'^°°
1) fair use is a technical infiingement which is excused or rather privileged for equitable
reasons:
'^^ Congress explained the goal of copyright as "not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily
for the benefit of the public". H.R. Rep. No. 2222. 60th Cong.. 2d Sess.. 7 (1909). quoted in . Richard
A. Bernstein, Fair Use in Copyright Law . 31 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 1, 36 (1984).
"Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it,
the courts must be free to adopt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." H.R. Rep.
No. 1476 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), quoted in , William F. Patry, 1 Copyright Law and Practice
720(1994).
'^' H. Ball, Law of Copyright and Literary Property 260 (1944).
'^^ 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841.
•''Id. at 348
^^ Deborah A. HarUiett, A New Era for Copyright Law: Reconstituting the Fair Use Doctrine
.
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Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 167, 177 (1992); Latman, supra note 151. at 784.
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2) fair use is an appropriation of unprotected material, thus no infringement occurs
because the use of the material falls out of the scope of copyright protection.
With respect to the first base considering fair use as a technical infinngement which is
privileged, the language of the copyright act does not seem to support this view The fair
use section describes fair use of a copyrighted work as "not an infringement of
copyright". ^°* Thus, the statute does not consider fair use as an infringement and treats it
as if it was not. Instead, the statute clearly states that fair use does not constitute
infringement.
As to the second theory considering fair use as an appropriation of unprotected
material, this view is far from the truth because unprotected material is open for use
without the help of the fair use doctrine. The Supreme Court in Feist held that there is a
right to use unprotected material of a copyrighted work.'^*'^ Therefore, this view does not
tackle the premise of fair use which allows appropriating protected materials,
b. Fair use: An Affirmative Right
The question dealing with the nature of fair use is even more troublesome than the
issue of fair use itself There is no real consensus on the nature of fair use, but most
commentators view fair use as an affirmative right to a claim of copyright infringement.
^°'*
This is true as a technical matter where a plaintiff can resort to fair use as a defense in an
infringement claim against him. Hence, its relevance arises when there exists unauthorized
copying and substantial similarity in expression between the parties' works. However, if
we were to look beyond the very basic fianction of fair use to the scope and purpose of the
doctrine, a realization that fair use is more than merely a defense emerges. Professor
^°' 17U.S.C. sl07(1976).
'^^'^
Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Serv.s. Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
^°^ ("Copyright does not prevent subsequent users from copying another author's work those constituent
elements that are not original") Id. at 350 citing Harper & Row Publishers. Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 547-48(1985).
^"^ Michael D. Brittin, Constitutional Fair Use . 28 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 141, 154 (1982);
Hartnett. supra note 200, at 167; Richard A. Bernstein. Parody and Fair Use in Copyright Law , 31
Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 1, 9 (1984); Patry. supra note 149, at 725.
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Patterson explains that fair use is not just an affirmative defense but an affirmative right as
v^ell. This conclusion is the only sound determination to reach when noting that fair use is
the only general limitation on all the exclusive rights of the author Thus, fair use is a
limitation on the rights of the author laid down in sections 1 06, 1 06A of the Copyright
Act.^°^ Moreover, there are no exceptions on the application of fair use as it applies to all
kinds of copyrighted works. With this foundation, we turn to the constitution, particularly
the First Amendment. The right to free speech encompasses the right of access to use
copyrighted materials for their constitutional purpose. ^"^ This inevitable nexus between
copyright and the First Amendment is necessary in order for us to protect the
constitutional policies of copyright. ^°^ Thus, with the wide scope of fair use as a general
limitation, and with its relevance to the First Amendment, fair use must be viewed as an
affirmative right.
2. The Nature of Fair Use in Continental Laws
The justification for permissible copying is attributed in continental laws either to the
implied consent of the author, or the enforced consent as a means to balance the interests
of the authors and those of the public. ^'^^ Another justification would be custom, that it is
customary to reasonably use author's work.^*^^ The enforced consent theory seems to be
adopted in Germany. This theory dictates that in order to strike the balance between the
interests of the authors and the public interest, consent of the author of reasonable uses of
his work needs to be enforced. This explanatory statement of the German Copyright Act
justifies fair use as a necessity of mutual exchange required for cultural creativity. ^^° That
^°*!7U.S.C.s 107 (1976).
^°^ L. Ray Patterson & Judge Stanley F. Birch. Junior, Copyright and Free Speech Rights . 4 J. Intell. Prop.
L. 1, 5 (1996).
207 T J „. r
Id. at 6.
^°^ Latman, supra note 151, at 785.
209
j^.
21
[T]he justifications for certain restrictions on copyright arises from the fact that the author
carries on his creative activity not in isolation from his environment but woven into his
cultural surroundings and on the foundation of the cultural achievements of preceding
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is, the balance of interests is represented by the author's rights on one hand and the
public's access to his work on the other.^'^ The nature of fair use in Germany could not be
categorized as a right especially where some uses require consent of the author. The
control an author has over his work to object to reproduction of it when it no longer
reflects his views^'^ makes fair use as a mere defense which is subject to exceptions. In
other provisions where remuneration is required for appropriation of a work, the theory of
enforced consent appears to justify such uses although an equitable amount of money
must still be paid to the author.
In France, reproduction by photocopying is justified by the implied consent of the
author as a result of having his work circulated to the public. The Copyright Act states in
this matter that "publication of a work shall imply assignment of the right of reprograghic
reproduction to a collecting society."^''* This implied consent of the author occurs upon
publication. As explained before, the fair use provision in the French Copyright
Act restricts published works to appropriation by the public. ^'^ Private uses of a
copyrighted work are explained as it being impossible to prohibit such uses. A remedy
imposed on those uses would invade a person's privacy and any attempt to prohibit these
uses is an attempt to reverse social trends. Thus, remuneration was established to
compensate the authors from such uses.'^^^
generations. On the other hand, the author is dependent on the acceptance and assimilation
of his work by his contemporaries. CuUural activity therefore constantly requires a
mutual exchange and a certain give-and-take.
211 u
9 Commercial Laws of Europe 274 (Eds. Luis Ten Kate &. Neville M. Hummings 1986).
A counterpart of the author's right to control the use of his work is therefore the right of the general
public to have unhindered access to the cultural inheritance" id.
''- Art. 53(4); 53(5); 52 (F.R.G.).
^'^ Art. 46(5) (F.R.G.).
^"ArtL. 122-10 (Fr).
^'^ Art. L. 122-5 (Fr.).
^'^ Nimmer & Gelle, supra note 189, at FRA-122.
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The nature of fair use in the continental system must be dealt with in two different
classes of uses. The uses that require remuneration must be distinguished from other uses.
When public matters, news reporting and brief quotations are at concern, fair use is
justified as a necessity for the balance of interests. Thus, the nature of these uses is being a
general limitation on author's rights to give unhindered access of the public to
information. Whereas when personal and private uses are at issue, the justification stems
fi^om the fact that it is impractical, if not impossible, for authors to police private uses. For
this reason the establishment of the remuneration system was the reasonable solution for
enforcing the claim of the authors.
^'^
Thus, the nature of personal uses is being a
necessary exception to authors rights as a practical matter.
D. Fair Use in the United States
1 . From a Judicial Doctrine to a Statutory Doctrine
Fair use was codified for the first time in the 1976 Act. Yet its roots date back to the
^218
nineteenth century. Some date the first fair use decision back to 1839 in Gray v.
Russell . ^'^ However, Justice Story's decision in Folsom v. Marsh^^° is said to have
established the criteria of a fair use analysis. Justice Story enunciated three of the current
four factors embodied in the 1976 Act. The first factor was the objects of the selection
made, being now the nature of the original work. The second was the quantity and value
of the materials used, being the current third factor. The last was the degree in which the
use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects of the original
work, being the current fourth statutory factor of effect on the market of the original
work. The reason for not including the current first statutory factor, being the purpose
of the use, was because of the facts in Folsom involving a writer the had published a work
^'^ Commercial Laws of Europe, supra note 187, at 274.
^'*
Patr\'. supra note 149, at 718.
^'^
10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839).
^^° 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
^^'
Id. at 343.
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containing excerpts from the plaintiffs work. Thus, there was only one purpose at that
time which was the use by a writer of another writer's work. This fact is of great
importance to understand the purpose of fair use as a judicial doctrine. At the time of
deciding this case, the controlling law was the Act of 1831 where copyright only
protected the book as it was published. Thus, the right the copyright owner had was to
reprint the book. In other words, it a was not an infringement to abridge material from
another author's copyrighted book. This narrow protection to the copyright proprietor
resulted in wide abridgment by authors of an original author' work. Justice Story sought
to get rid of this wide abridgment doctrine by restricting it to fairness. Ironically, the
judicial fair use doctrine was established to expand the narrow copyright monopoly. The
judicial doctrine continued in the consequent acts until it was codified in the 1976 Act.
The reason for this was because the limited copyright monopoly existing before the
current act meant there was no need to codify the doctrine. As the monopoly expanded
Congress realized the necessity to codify fair use. But in this instance fair use was codified
for a totally reversed purpose; to limit the copyright monopoly.
This being the most important variation between the statutory fair use and the judicial
doctrine is not well realized by many courts. Professor L. Ray Patterson explains that the
fallacy courts fall into is continuation to follow the precedent of the judicially created
doctrine rather than applying the codified doctrine. This jurisprudencial error must be
taken into account so as to achieve the purpose of the statutory doctrine. The House of
Representatives Report concerning fair use explains that "section 107 is intended to
restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any
way." However, another important change in the doctrine was that fair use was no
longer restricted to "productive use".'^^^ Under the judicial doctrine, fair use was
established for uses among authors, thus a productive use was considered a
^^^ H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976).
^" Patry, supra note 149, at 720.
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requirement.^^"* As for the codified doctrine, passive uses may be considered fair use as
well.^^^ The Supreme Court in a decision involving a passive use- being private off-air
home video taping- upheld fair use. The Court stated that the fact the use was socially
productive was not wholly determinative and that a transformative use was not necessary
for a finding of fair use.^^^
In conclusion, fair use as a statutory doctrine is different and broader than the judicially
created doctrine. Therefore following the precedents of the judicial fair use may result in
undermining the scope and purpose of the present statutory doctrine.
2. The Preamble and the Factors of Fair use
Section 107 of the Copyright Act setsforth illustrative purposes for fair uses in the
preamble and four guiding factors to be included in determining whether the use is fair.^^^
The preamble enumerates six purposes as examples of fair uses that are not an
infiingement of copyright. Fair use is a general limitation on the exclusive rights of
authors in sections 106, 106A. The enumerated purposes are not limitative by the
language of the statute containing the term "such as". Interestingly however, these
^"''
i.e., the degree in which the use may supersede the objects of the original. See supra note 222 and
accompanying text.
^^^ Patry, supra note 149, at 720.
226
227
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 465 (1984).
[N]ot withstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. s 107 (1976).
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puqjoses would seem to draw a presumption of furthering learning and progress of
science and arts through teaching, scholarship and research. The remaining enumerated
purposes of news reporting, criticism and comment seem to regard the constitutional right
of free speech which encompasses the rights to read, speak, hear, print and access to
information. '^'^^ However, the Supreme Court did not allow presumptions of fairness on
any of the uses.^^^ In any event, this treatment of applies to purposes other than those
mentioned in the preamble which means that any other purpose is not presumed unfair,
a. The First Factor: The Purpose and Character of the Use, Including Whether Such Use
is of a Commercial Nature or is for Non-Profit Educational Purposes.
This factor examines the purpose of the secondary use. Whether the use is of a
commercial character or of an educational character is only one example of how courts
analyze the first factor inquiry. The term "including" makes that inquiry an illustrative
element. ^^° Also, this inquiry focuses on the type of use being made rather than the entity
making the use. Thus, a for-profit organization using a work does not render the use a
commercial one. Moreover, the main clause of the first factor speaks of "purpose and
character" thus, there is no presumption setforth in concluding that a use is commercial.
Neither is there such a presumption when the use is found to be educational. The Supreme
Court stated that "the mere fact that a use is educational does not insulate it from a
finding of infringement any more than the commercial character of a use bars a finding of
fairness.
"^^^
As to the meaning of the term "commercial", it is important to note that almost every
secondary use has a commercial aspect surrounding it in some form of financial gain.^^'^
'^^ Patterson & Birch, supra note 206, at 6.
^^^ Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters.. 471 U.S. 539. 561 (1985) ("The drafters resisted
230
pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive categories of fair use") id.
Campbell v. AcufF-Rose Music, Inc.. 510 U.S 569, 584 (1994).
^^'
Id.
232
Patry, supra note 149, at 731.
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Therefore, the inquiry of commerciality must examine the degree of commerciality not
whether there exists any financial gain or not.
Earlier Supreme Court Decisions did not analyze the first factor clearly which caused
confusion among the lower courts. In Sony, the court held that "every commercial use of
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privileges
that belongs to the owner of the copyright. "'^^^ The Harper Court cites this statement in
analyzing the first factor,^'^'* The Harper court continues in its analysis to render another
confiising statement. The Court stated that the "crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is
not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to
profit fi^om exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary
price."^^^ This striking statement is sufficient to confijse all the lower courts. The Court's
language is surprising because it speaks as if there were compulsory licensing in the
United States or as if there exists a price to pay in the first place. As we have shown, fair
use does not require any consent fi^om the copyright owner or reimbursement for the use.
In any event, the Campbell decision came to clarify any confiasion among the courts
regarding these statements in the first factor analysis. The Supreme Court in Campbell
refiised the Sixth Circuit's analysis of the first factor by restricting it to commerciality and
presuming it unfair when commerciality is found according to Sony,"^ and refused to give
the commercial nature of the secondary use "dispositive weight". ^^^^ The Court stated that
Sony "called for no hard evidentiary presumption" because if such a presumption was held
it would swallow all the illustrative purposes in the preamble since they are generally
conducted for profit. ^^^ The court concluded its analysis of the first factor to clarify that
Sony stands for the proposition that commerciality tends to weigh against fair use but it
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios. Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
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Harper & Row Publishers. Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 439, 562 (1985).
^^^Id.
^^^ Campbell v. AcufF-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583-84 (1994).
^^'
Id. at 584.
49
stated that such a tendency varies according to the context which adds another reason
"against elevating commerciality to hard presumptive significance". ^^^ This closes any
confusion that had emerged concerning commerciality.
The manner in which particular material of the original work is used, is another inquiry
under the first factor. This inquiry asks whether the secondary use was for purposes of
marketing the precise form of the copyright owner's expression and thus tilting the first
factor to weigh in favor of the plaintiff, or whether the purpose of the secondary use was
to add something new or make an additional statement thus endorsing a public interest
and tilting the first factor to weigh in favor of the defendant. ^"^"^ This inquiry deals with
whether the use is transformative and productive meaning that it adds something new, or
whether its passive, meaning that it merely supersedes the objects of the original. Yet
passive uses can be fair and were upheld so in Sony where off-air video tape recording
was challenged. This challenged use was a private use. In Sony , the Court emphasized
Congress' special and protective treatment for private uses.^''^ The Court explains that
treatment in section 106 where the owner enjoys the right to perform his work publicly. '^''^
This language embodies the special treatment for private uses because the owner is not
afforded protection from private performances by others. The Court then refers to another
treatment of private uses in section 1 08 permitting a copy for a patron only for specific
types of private use.^'*^^ The Supreme Court in Campbell cites Sony that a transformative
use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use.^'^'* However, the Court highlights
the importance of transformative works in flirthering the goal of copyright. ^'^^ Some
^^^
Id. at 585.
^^° Patry, supra note 149, at 733.
^^' Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 467 (1984).
^'^ 17 use. s 106(4) (1976).
^^^ Sony , at 469.
^'"' Campbell v. AcufF-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
'''
Id.
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purposes, particularly parody, are dealt with extensively in fair use law This is so because
of the well-developed case-law for parodic purposes. Parody which is usually a fiction is a
good example of a transformative work. In Campbell the Court announced that parody
has "an obvious claim to transformative value". "^"^^ The Court ended its discussion on
transformative works by stating "the more transformative the new work, the less will be
significance of other factors.
"'^'*^
With respect to the educational purpose, section 107 is said to be a step forward fi-om
the judicial doctrine to widen the applicability of fair use and give a degree of certainty for
educational uses."^"*^ The House Judiciary Subcommittee Hearings on the revision of the
Copyright Law called on the involved parties of educators and publishers to get together
and agree on permissible uses of copyrighted works for educational purposes.
^"^^
Unfortunately, the result was an "Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in
Non-For-Profit Educational Institutions which provided a very narrow understanding of
section 107 and cannot in any represent its limits. It would be absurd to say that these
guidelines replace section 107. Such a narrow understanding of the fair use doctrine
would undermine the scope and purpose of the doctrine. In any event, these guidelines do
not have any legal power. Professor Patterson explains that these guidelines function as a
safe harbor. Consequently, if a use fell into the limits of these guidelines, it would certainly
be considered fair. However, if a use was not within the scope of the guidelines, no
presumption is created, rather the use would be considered according to the factors
setforth in the statute.
Another purpose of concern under the first factor is "reverse engineering" With regard
to this purpose it has not been dealt with by the Supreme Court. However, it was
246 j^
^"^ Stephen Freid, Fair Use and the New Act, The Complete Guide to the New Copyright Law, 205, 217
(1977).
^"^ H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong.. 2d Sess. 67 (1976).
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addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Sega Enterprises, Ltd., v. Accolade, Inc ^^" This purpose
comes into existence when one disassembles a computer program to learn the
uncopyrightable elements of the program. This disassembly operation would necessarily
mean reproduction of that program. The Ninth Circuit held it fair use to reproduce such a
program for purposes of determining the ideas and functional elements embodied
therein.
^^^
A misappropriate nexus between the first factor and the fourth may be critical in a fair
use analysis. To be more precise, the amount of financial gain or success the defendant's
work has enjoyed should not be decisive of the commercial finding. Such a conclusion
would render any financial success of the secondary use an unfair use by abolishing all the
other factors. Therefore, the fact that a secondary use was sold in thousands of copies
does not make it any more commercial than if it had sold in a substantially lesser amount,
b. The Second Factor: The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
This factor embodies more than one inquiry to be examined, one of which is whether
the original work is published. Another inquiry into this factor is whether the copyrighted
work is fictional (entertainment) or factual (informational).
With respect to the first inquiry, there had been confijsion among courts that led to
finding infiingement whenever the original work is unpublished.^" The reasoning in that
context was that unpublished works should not be used without the consent of the author.
This misunderstanding of the law led Congress to enact an amendment^" adding a
sentence to section 107 stating there is no per se rule of barring fair use when unpublished
works are at concern. "The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of
fair use if such finding is upon consideration of all the above factors."^^'* This rule was not
250 997 p 2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
"'
Id. at 1527-28.
^" Patry, supra note 149, at 766.
"^ Act of January 19, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 106 Stat. 3145 (1992).
^^^ 17 U.S.C. s 107 (1992).
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a new rule to the Act, rather it was congruent with Congress' intent in the 1976 Act
However, it was necessary to clarify the confusion among courts that had developed on
this particular subject. The Supreme Court addressed the weight of unpublished works
and considered it a "key though not necessarily determinative factor, tending to negate a
defense of fair use".'^" The Court nonetheless found infringement yet because this
decision was peculiar to its facts. The Harper decision was not decisive on the
unpublished nature of the copyrighted work but because of the facts of this case,
particularly the bad faith on the defendant's side^^^ and the right of first publication to the
copyright owner. The Court found that the defendant's intention was "supplanting the
copyright holder's commercially valuable right of first publication".^" The Court seemed
to use the fair use analysis in a manner that would dispose the defendant's argument. The
Court stated that "under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first
public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use".^^^
This sentence may have created confusion among the lower courts. However the rule of
unpublished works is the same as that for commercial purposes. They are important in a
fair use analysis yet they are neither decisive nor presumptive in a finding of infringement,
instead, they must be weighed along with the other factors.
With respect to the second inquiry under this factor, factual works usually enjoy less
protection, if any, than fictional works. Feist pointed out that facts themselves are not
subject to copyright protection but compilations of facts are within the scope of copyright
if the onginality requirement is met.^^^ This brings us back to the constitutional right of
free speech and securing unhindered access to information for the public. This would
explain the Supreme Court's statement in Stewart v. Abend that "fair use is more likely to
^^^ Harper & Row, Publishers. Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985).
"'Id. at 562-63.
"'
Id. at 562.
"^
Id. at 555.
"^ Feist Publications, Inc.. v. Rural Telephone Servs.. 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
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be found in factual works than fictional works. "^^° The Campbell Court agreed that the
fictional works are creative expressions that fall within the core of copyright's protective
purposes. ^^' The Court stated that "there is a greater need to disseminate factual works
than works of fiction. "'^^^ Yet fair use could be claimed in either case. This factor is only
one to be examined.
c. The Third Factor: The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in Relation to the
Copyrighted Work as a Whole
This factor addresses the amount of copyrighted work used in the secondary work. In
general, the more substantial the portion the less likely this factor will weigh in favor of
fair use. However, this is not always the rule as will be demonstrated. The fact that a
substantial portion has been used fi'om the original and that this portion only constitutes a
minor part of the secondary work does not change the substantiality fact. Although in this
latter case, the transformative nature would be evident. The Supreme Court explained
"the statutory language indicates, a taking must not be excused merely because it is
insubstantial with respect to the infringing work".^^^
Under this inquiry, it is important to apply the idea/expression dichotomy on the
portion used. That is, all the unprotected material that are used in the secondary work
must be filtered out. The ideas and unoriginal facts cannot support a finding of
infiingement no matter how substantial they are A totality approach by the courts when
examining this inquiry would lead to an erroneous result. ^^'* This means that looking as a
whole at the portion used is not an adequate application of the law because unprotected
materials are not subject to the third factor or any factor in this case. Such an approach
^^'^ Stewart V. Abend. 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990).
^^' Campbell v. AcufiF-Rose Music, Inc.. 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
^^^ Harper & Row , at 563
.
^" Harper & Row , at 565.
^^ Hartnett, supra note 200, at 199-200.
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would bloat the material taken by including unprotected material and result in a finding of
substantiality.
Another examination of this factor is whether the preparation of the secondary work
reasonably required some use of the copyrighted materials. That is, how much was it
necessary for the second comer to use the original work in light of the purpose of the
secondary work. Servile imitation does not promote learning.^''''
A nexus between this factor and the first factor is helpfiil in adequately determining
how much copying was fair. The amount of material taken must be congruent with the
asserted purpose and suffice to the extent of achieving that purpose. The Supreme Court
endorsed this nexus in Campbell by stating "once enough has been taken to assure
identification, how much more is reasonable will depend, say on the extent to which the
song's overriding purpose and character is to parody the original.
"^^^
The inquiry under the third factor includes both the quantity and quality of the portion
used. Thus, the value of materials used is important as well. This value encompasses what
is referred to as the "heart of the original" when what is taken is the most valuable in the
work. Thus, when the heart of the original is what has been used, substantiality becomes
evident unless that portion was necessary in the secondary work. Some works, such as
parody may require substantial portions of the original work^''^ The Campbell Court held
that the "heart of the original" is what is necessary to parody the plaintiffs song and it is
the heart of the original by which parody takes aim. Therefore, the Court stated that
copying may not become excessive in relation to parodic purposes even when the material
taken is the heart of the original. ^^^
^^^
Id. at 200.
^^^
Brittin, supra note 204. at 182.
^^^ Campbell v. Acufif-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994).
^^^
Id. at 598.
^^^
Id. at 589.
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The amount of protected works to be used fairly differs from one party to another
Some parodies require substantial copying while others need only small portions of the
original work, differing according to the target parodies are aiming towards
d. The Fourth Factor: The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for or Value of
the Copyrighted Work
This factor touches the philosophy of granting a monopoly. The economic incentive
given to the authors in order to enhance creativity and thus, enriching the public by
promoting science and useful arts is in practice the royalty given to the copyright owner
However, no such royalty is required when the use is fair. Moreover, there is no
compulsory license in the United States.
The relationship of the fourth factor to the economic incentive has made it sometimes
the most important factor. The Supreme Court in Harper considered the fourth factor
"undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use".^^' Professor Melville
Nimmer suggested that decisions involving fair use can best be explained by looking to the
extent to which the defendant's creation tends to diminish the potential market for the
plaintiffs work. He views the fourth factor as decisive or at least significant. ^^^ However,
the legislative history provides that the "relative weight to be given [the statutory factors]
will differ from case to case".'^^^
The philosophy underlying this factor is that absent incentives, authors will not bother
to create. And what better evidence of a diminished incentive than negative effect of a
person's use on the market of the copyrighted work. This harmonization between the
^^°
Id. at 598. (Kennedy, J. concurring.
^'' Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters. 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
^^
1 Melville Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright s 13.05 (1980).
^'^ H. R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong.. 2d Sess. 72 (1976).
"No man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money". 3 Boswell's Life of Johnson 19 (G. Hill ed.
1934), quoted in . Campbell at 584.
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economic incentive and fair use embodied in the fourth factor is necessary for adequate
function of this law. The balance in this matter becomes weighing the economic rights of
the author on one extreme, and weighing the interests of the public in dissemination of
works on the other. The resuh should in all cases achieve the purpose of copyright to
promote learning.
When examining this factor, courts take in consideration that the potential market
includes both the market of the original work and the market of the derivative works or
future derivative works. ^^^ Yet, an expansive definition of the potential market that
copyright law protects should not deminish the scope of fair use. Thus, a safe approach in
defining the potential market is to include uses currently exploited by the copyright owner
and uses that the owner would have interest in exploiting in the future. ^^^ This is why
parody prevailed in Campbell where the court found it unlikely for the plaintiff to license
such a criticism of his own work because there is no protectible derivative market for
criticism. ^^^ Parody and the parodied serve different market functions which makes it
unlikely that the secondary work will serve as a substitute of the original. ^^^ The uhimate
inquiry under the fourth factor is whether the secondary work replaces the market of the
original and consequently diminish the profit of the original author.
Another important fact to point out in this respect that a refusal by the copyright
owner to license his material to the secondary user should not be considered as evidence
of affecting the market for the original work. Permission to use a work is neither a
requirement for fair use nor an indication of infringement. ^^^ Additionally, when examining
the effect on the market, courts should not consider harm caused by dissemination of
"The inquiry on the fourth factor must take account not only of harm to the original but also of harm
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to the market for derivative works'" Harper & Row at 568.
Patry, supra note 149, at 575.
Campbell , at 592.
^'^
Id. at 591.
"^
Id. at 585 n. 18.
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unprotected facts and information. Therefore, unprotected material should not be
considered as part of the harm that may be caused by the secondary work.
Under the fourth factor, a plaintiff need not show actual present harm to win this
factor in his favor. Otherwise, this would lead to an absurd result when he falls short in
proving predictable damage. "^^"^ The harm this factor is concerned with is not any harm
caused to the original work. Yet the replacement of the original by the secondary work
because of substantial copying is the test. A parody may affect the market of a work
because of its criticism to the work, but that is not the inquiry under the fourth factor.
Instead, the inquiry is whether the secondary work serves as a substitute to the original.
The Supreme Court explained that parody and the original serve different market
functions which makes parody less likely to affect the market by acting as a substitute.^^^
The effect on the market may be legitimate if it is a result of criticism to the original
that has caused consumers to retreat from the original. However, the effect is not
legitimate if it will cause consumers to purchase the secondary work as a replacement for
the original. The Supreme Court explains that biting criticism that suppresses demand
must be distinguished from copyright infringement that wrongfully takes position of the
original. ^^^ This is because of the nature of parody that bears sarcasm and criticism which
may legitimately draw away the demand for the work being criticized.
As to the effect of parody on the derivative work market, there is no clear cut
presumption that parody will never harm the market for derivative works. Yet it would be
sound to state that the copyright owner would unlikely develop or license others to
develop parodic works of their own creations. Thus, the inquiry again for finding effect of
"Actual present harm need not be shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder with no
defense against protectible damage" Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Citv Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 451
(1984).
^^' Campbell , at 591.
^^^
Id. at 592.
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secondary works on the market of the secondary works is whether the parody will act as a
substitute for present or future derivative work market.
In conclusion, all the factors of fair use are to be examined. It is not a calculating
process but rather a weighing process. The purpose of copyright should be the guidance
of courts in this process. '^^'* The guideline in determining fair use is whether permission of
a secondary use will enhance the constitutional goal of promoting science and arts. Thus,
if a use promotes the goal of copyright, toleration of such a use is not discretionary, but
rather, it is compelled by the guarantee of free speech.
^^^
E. Fair Use in France.
In a country where natural law guided the development of the law of the authors,
limitations on author's rights are an exception to the principle, but nevertheless they exist.
As opposed to Germany however, the French Copyright law does not enumerate in
extensive detail the limitations on economic rights of the author. The economic rights of
the authors in France comprise of two rights; the right of reproduction, and the right of
performance. The law in France distinguishes in terms of exceptions to the author's
economic rights between the right of performance and he right of reproduction The
article containing the exceptions to the economic rights specifically applies to published
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[T]he market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works
would in general develop or license others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood that creators of
imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions remove
such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market.
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All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright." ) id.
Brittin. supra note 204, at 178. ("If the law is to remain on a steady and progressive course, it must
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286
'The right of exploitation belonging to the author shall comprise the right of performance and the
right of reproduction." Art. L. 122-1 (Ft.).
59
works. ^^^ Article L. 211-3 contains the same provisions to this article, only that it applies
to neighboring rights.
1 . Exceptions to the Reproduction Right
a. Private and Other Personal Uses
With respect to private uses, we have learnt that prohibiting this use is impractical if
not impossible, otherwise there would be invasion of individuals' privacy. Article L. 122-
5(2) governs reproduction for private use. This article specifically indicates that
reproductions should be restricted to private use. This article precludes reproductions
"intended" for collective use. Thus, reproducing a work in its entirety without the consent
of the author is permissible as long as it is for personal use and occurs on a published
work. While reproducing a work in multiple copies raises the presumption that the use is
for collective purposes. ^^^ The term "copier" is not defined by the law, but commentaries
describe him as "whoever makes the copy".'^^^ The Court of Cassaation (Cour de
Cassation)- being the highest court in France- held that a photocopy service is considered
^^^ [Olnce a work has been disclosed, the author may not prohibit:
(1) Private and gratuitous performances carried out exclusively withm the family circle,
(2) Copies or reproductions reserved strictly for the private use of the copier and not intended for
collective use, with the exceptions of copies of works of art to be used for purposes identical to those
for which the original work was created and copies of software other than backup copies made in
accordance with paragraph II of Article 1. 122-6-1,
(3) On condition that the name of the author and the source are clearly stated:
(a)Analyses and short quotations justified by the critical, polemic, educational , scientific or
informatory nature of the work in which they are incorporated;
(b) Press reviews;
(c) Dissemination, even in their entirety, through the press or by telediffiision, as current news, of
speeches intended for the public made in political, administrative, judicial, or academic gatherings, as
also in public meetings of a political nature and at official ceremonies;
(4)Parody, pastiche and caricature, observing the rules of the genre.
Art. L. 122-5 (Fr.).
^^^ Nimmer &, Gelle, supra note 189, at FRA-123.
^*^ H. Desbois, Le droit d'auteur en France, no. 239 (3rd ed., Paris, 1978).
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a copier for purposes of this article. ^^" However, such a recognition does not immune the
photocopier from infringement, as this is only the first requirement in this permissible use
The second requirement- that the copying is for personal use- must be met as well. This
indicates that the provision applies to natural persons as well as to artificial persons so
long as the "private" requirement is met. However, commentators seem to construe this
provision narrowly to be applied only for natural persons. The reasoning of this view is to
favor the wide copyright protection rather than narrowing it by favoring the copier ^^' The
law is not clear on this subject, but generally speaking, a private use made within an
artificial person is within the meaning of this provision. Thus, a scientist reproducing a
work for his personal files is not an infringer.
As to precluding collective uses from this provision, the term "collective" is anything
but narrow. A copy made by one person transforms from a private use to a collective use
the moment this copy is made available to others. An example of this sort is an employee
making a copy, violates the copyright law once it is used in the context of a business
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Where private copying is concerned, remuneration must be paid to the copyright
owners. Articles L. 311-1 through L. 311-8 contain the provisions governing
remuneration for private reproduction of works fixed on phonograms or videograms.
Remuneration is also required for works fixed on sound and audiovisual recordings. This
remuneration scheme targets manufacturers and importers of recording mediums such as
blank tapes. " The amount of remuneration will vary according to the medium used.^^'*
^^'^ Cass. civ. 1, March 7, 1984. R.I.D.A 1984, no. 121, 151. quoted in . Nimmer & Gelle, supra note . at s
8FRA- 123 n. 38.
^^' Nimmer & Gelle, supra note 189, at FRA-123.
^'^Id. atFRA-124.
"The remuneration laid down m Article L. 311-3 shall be paid by the manufacturer or importer of
recording mediums that may be used for reproduction for private use of works fixed on phonograms or
videograms, at the time these mediums enter into circulation in France.
The amount of the remuneration shall depend on the type of medium and the recording time it
provides.
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However, there are exceptions to applying this provision.^'' Where the recording medium
is not used for private reproduction, then this use is not subject to remuneration.
In any event, the resulting costs from this remuneration scheme is passed on to the
individuals when purchasing the recording mediums. Thus, private reproductions are
permitted but the end-user would have already paid a levy.
Another form of private reproduction could take place through reprography.
Reprography is defined as reproduction in the form of copies on paper or comparable
media, by photographic or functionally equivalent technologies that allow for the direct
perception of a work.^^^ Once a work has been published, an implied assignment is drawn
by the author to the designated collecting society. ^^^ Thus, the reprographic collecting
societies have the legal standing to bring suits of infringement in this respect. However,
the narrow definition of reprography restricts the collecting society from demanding
remuneration from an individual which had copied for his own personal use. The society
may claim remuneration from Universities and companies which make copies for their
students or employees or clients. ^^^
With respect to computer programs, a separate article deals with reproduction of such
a work. Nevertheless, the fair use provision specifically prohibits reproduction of
software programs for private use in a copy other than backup copies made according to
Article L. 122-6-1.^"^ The Court of Cassation when applying this provision, held that a
Art. L. 311-4 (Fr).
^^^ Art. L. 311-8 (Fr.).
^^^ Art. L. 122-10(2) (Fr.).
^^^ Nimmer & Gelle, supra note 189, at FRA-126.
-^ Art. L. 122-6-1 (Fr.).
^'^
Art. L. 122-5(2) (Fr.).
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user cannot rely on the "one backup copy" to justify overriding copy-protection devices
used by the software supplier.^"^
Another exemption from the exception of the reproduction right of the author is
reproducing works of art. Works of art cannot be reproduced for private use if the
purpose of the reproduction was the same purpose upon which the artistic work was
created/*"^ In other words, a portrait cannot be reproduced for obtaining or displaying it
on the wall.
b. Public Uses
Copying for uses made to the public are subject to acknowledgment. The name of the
author and the source from which the reproduction occurred must be clearly indicated in
the secondary work. Reproduction under this provision is exempted from the author's
rights for three types of uses.
^""^
The first type of uses under this provision is analyses and short quotations. The Article
specifies that the secondary work under this provision should be of a polemic,
educational, scientific or informatory character. To the extent that the reproduction
should be short, the Court of Cassation held it permissible to quote materials from
newspapers and incorporate them into a database even without adding something new by
the secondary user.^'^'* The Court found that such a use is justified by the informative
character and thus qualifies as an exception to the reproduction right. ^"^ With respect to
reproducing works of art, the Court of Cassation denied applying this exception for
^°' Cass. com. May 23, 1991. J.C.P. 1991, quoted in
.
Nimmer & Gelle, supra note 189, at FRA-126.
^°- Art. L. 122-5(2).
^^^
Art. L. 122-5(3)(a); (b); (c).
^°^ Cass. civ. I, Nov. 9. 1983, J.C.P. 1984. II, 20189, quoted in , Nimmer & Gelle. supra note 189, at FRA-
127.
'''Id.
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reproduction of a work of art in its entirety. ^°^ The latter rule applies to works of art being
incorporated into an audiovisual work. The Court of Cassation held it infringement to
broadcast sculptures or paintings on television and rejected the defense that these uses
on-?
were of informational character.
Press reviews are the second type of public uses permitted under this provision The
Court of Cassation explained press reviews as "bringing together and comparison of
diverse commentaries by various journalists that concern the same subject or event.""
Thus, within this meaning of press reviews, quoting articles and commentaries is
permissible as long as the acknowledgment requirement is met.
The third type of public uses is disseminating public speeches. "^^^ The copying allowed
in this instance is reproducing public speeches even in their entirety. However, only the
enumerated speeches in this article are to be disseminated. The limitative speeches are
those made in political, administrative, judicial, or academic gatherings, and public
political meetings or official ceremonies. ^'°
c. Parody, Pastiche and Caricature
Another exception to the reproduction right of the author is works of parody, pastiche
and caricature. The wording of the paragraph containing these uses is rather broad and
provides no indication of the extent that these works apply as an exception. On the other
hand, the law is settled that for these works to qualify as an exception, proof of comic
intent is required.^*' However, only the author's intent to parody is required. Thus if the
^^ Cass. civ. I, Jan. 22, 1991, R.l.D.A. 1991, no. 148, 119, quoted in , Nimmer & Gelle, supra note 189,
atFRA-127.
^°' See, e^, Cass. civ. I, July 4, 1995, R.l.D.A. 1996, no. 167, 259, quoted in , Nimmer & Gelle, supra
note 189, atFRA-128.
^°^ Cass, crim.., Jan. 30, 1978, 583, note la calvez, quoted in . Nimmer & Gelle, supra note 189, at FRA-
128.
^^ Art. L. 122-5(3)(c) (Ft.).
^" Nimmer & Gelle, supra note 189, at FRA-129.
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parody did not have actual comic effect, that shall not bar the secondary work from
qualifying as an exception. As for the permissible amount of portions to be included in the
secondary work, this would vary depending on the nature of that work. The border line in
terms of amount is the distinction between the market of the secondary work and the
market of the original. Thus, a parody must not replace the original.
The paragraph concerning this exception provides that the laws governing these works
must be given regard. Therefore, the moral right to respect of the author's work"*^^ will
override such exceptions if this right was abused.
2. Exceptions to the Performance Right
a. Private Performance
Private performances are permissible on condition that the performance takes place in
a family circle and that it is free. With respect to the first condition, a family circle is any
gathering of family or friends. The courts have excluded a number of gatherings that are
not within the meaning of family circles. One of these excluded gatherings is a group of
employees working at the same company. ^^^ The second condition is met when members
of the family circle are not required to pay or contribute to the costs of the
performance. Thus, the inquiry here is not whether any profit was made from the
performance, but that the audience did not pay in any form for that work.
b. Public Performance
The uses explained above of public reproduction of analyses and quotations, press
reviews, public speeches^ *^ and the uses of parody, pastiche and caricature^ '^ are
^'' Art. L. 121-1 (Ft.).
^'^ Nimmer & Gelle, supra note 189. at FRA-131.
^'''
Desbois, Le droit d'auteur en France, no. 281, (3rd ed.. Paris, 1978).
^'^Art. L. 122-5(3) (Fr).
^'^
Art. L. 122-5(4) (Fr).
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applicable to public performance. The term "teledifflision" in the Article containing the
exceptions supports this finding.
F. Fair Use in the Berne Convention
The Berne Convention contains a number of articles dealing with permissible uses One
of these articles contains the conditions under which a member state may permit
reproduction of protected works. Article 9(2) allows for legislation that permits
reproduction as a limitation on the authors rights. "^'^ The freedom allowed for the member
countries to limit the exclusive right of reproduction and permit works to be reproduced is
subject to two conditions. The first, that the reproduction must not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work. The second, the reproduction must not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the author.
With respect to the first condition, if any conflict is present with the normal
exploitation of the work, reproduction is not permitted at all under this provision. An
example of this conflict is school books and novels which are normally exploited by selling
them to the public. Thus, a member country cannot permit exploitation of these works
under compulsory licensing. ^'^
With respect to the second condition, the question of whether the secondary use
prejudices the author's interest is a matter of degree not existence. That is, the inquiry
under this condition asks to what extent has the author's interest been prejudiced not
whether it has been prejudiced at all. This is because all copying damages the author's
right in some degree. ^^"^ Therefore, this condition focuses on whether the prejudice was
^'' Nimmer & Gelle, supra note 189, at FRA-131.
"It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such
works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and does not um^easonably prejudice the legitimate mterests of the author."
Art. 9(2) Berne Convention
^ World Intellectual Property Org., Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971) 55 (1978).
''°
Id. at 56.
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reasonable. And finally, it rests with each country to make appropriate measures best
adapted to its educational, cultural, and social and economic development.
1 . Free Uses
Article 10 of the Berne Convention specifies a number of uses as a limitation on the
author's exclusive right to exploit his work. It lays down the conditions for quotations and
illustrations for teaching. These uses however, are subject to an acknowledgment
requirement that the source and the name of the author from which the use occurred be
mentioned.
''^'
a. Quotations
Quoting fi^om a protected work is permissible under this provision. This permissible
use is not confined to certain works by indication of the term "including". However, this
fi'ee use is subject to four limitations.
The first limit is that quotation is permissible only for published works. Thus,
unpublished works are not fi"ee to quote. This stipulation is found in many continental
laws. Another limit to quotation is that it must be "compatible with fair practice". This
phrase is not self-explanatory. However, it is a question for the courts in each member
country to determine what is considered fair practice. Factors to be examined in this
inquiry are the amount of portion used and the effect of the use on the market of the
321
(1) [I]t shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been lawfully
made available to the public, provided that their making is compatible with fair practice, and
their extent does not exceed that justified by the purpose, including quotations from
newspapers articles and periodicals in the form of press summanes.
(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union, and for special
agreements existing or to be concluded between them, to permit the utilization, to the extent
justified by the purpose, of literary or artistic works by way of illustration in publications,
broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided such utilization is compatible
with fair practice.
(3) Where use is made of works in accordance with the preceding paragraphs of this Article,
mentioned shall be made of the source, and of the name of the author if it appears thereon.
Art. 10 Berne Convention.
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protected work.^^"^ The third limit confines quotations to the extent justified by the
purpose of the use. This inquiry focuses on the extent upon which the quotation is needed
for the contemplated use. The amount of protected work used must be congruent with the
purpose of that use. The Paris text deleted the term "short" that had existed in the
preceding Act to describe permissible quotations. Thus, the "short passages" restriction is
dropped in the present law."^^^ As to the fourth limit, acknowledgment is required
whenever a protected work has been quoted.
b) Illustrations for Teaching
This provision also dropped the term "abstracts" that had existed in the Stockholm text
of 1967.^^'* This provision allows use of protected works for teaching. This use
encompasses both literary and artistic works. It allows school broadcasting and sound and
visual recording for teaching ends. It is worth to note that the term "teaching" includes
teaching at all levels. As for mere scientific research, it does not seem to be included
within this provision.
^^^
And finally, the third paragraph of Article 10 requires acknowledgment upon the use.
The use is subject to indicating the source and the name of the author if that name is
stated on the source.
^'^ World Intellectual Property Org., supra note 319, at 58.
^^^
Id. at 59.
'-'
Id. at 60.
^"Id.
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2. Further Possible Free Uses
a. Articles in Newspapers or Broadcasts
This paragraph is concerned with reproduction of articles by the press. This provision
however is optional and subject to reservation by authors. This use is not confined to
reproduction in newspapers but includes broadcasting as well. However, the paragraph
stipulates that the articles and broadcasts must be of current topical interest and of an
economic, political, or religious nature. Also, two conditions must be met for
reproduction of unreserved articles under this provision. The first is that the articles be
published. The second is indication of the source in a clear manner on the secondary
work.
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b. Reporting Current Events
This provision deals with reporting of news of current events. It allows the
reproduction of literary and artistic works that are heard or seen during the reporting of
current events. The reasoning in this context is that it would be impossible to seek the
consent of the owner in advance.
The conditions of this use are that the protected work must be seen or heard in the
event itself, that is
,
incidental. Another condition is that the inclusion of protected works
^^*
[I]t shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the
reproduction by the press, the broadcasting or the communication to the public by wire
of articles published in newspapers or periodicals on current economic, political or
religious topics, and of broadcast works of the same character, in cases in which the
reproduction, broadcasting or such communication thereof is not expressly reserved.
Nevertheless, the source must always be clearly indicated; the legal consequences of a
breach of this obligation shall be determined by the legislation of the country where
protection is claimed.
Art. lObis(l) Berne Convention.
^^'
[I]t shall also be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the
conditions under which, for the purpose of reporting current events by means of photography,
cinematography, broadcasting or communication to the public by wire, literar>' or artistic
works seen or heard in the course of the event may, to the extent justified by tlie informatory
purpose, be reproduced and made available to the public.
Art. 10bis(2) Berne Convention.
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in the report must be justified by the informatory purpose. This assumes that the
reproduction should not exceed the reasonable reporting when reproducing the protected
work. The purpose must not become the reproduction itself but rather to serve an
informative work.
The language of this paragraph is dijEferent fi^om the first paragraph which allows the
countries "to permit the reproduction". ^^^ This paragraph reads that the countries are fee
to "determine the conditions under which works may. be reproduced". These conditions
may do away with prior consent of the author.
3. Use of Lectures and Addresses'^^^
This provision allows the reproduction of oral works. This use is confined to speeches
delivered in public. The use must also be justified by the informatory purpose. The
substance of the speech itself is not of importance as long as the intention of the
reproduction was to inform the pubUc of what the speaker said.
^^* Art. lObis(l) Berne Convention.
^^^
[I]t shall be also a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the
conditions under which lectures, addresses and other works of the same nature which are
delivered in public may be reproduced by the press, broadcast, communicated to the public by
wire and made the subject of public communication as envisaged in Article 1 Ibis(l) of this
convention, when such use is justified by the informatory purpose.
Art. 2bis(2) Berne Convention.
V. CONCLUSION.
Fair use in America is substantially different from that of the continental countries
Understanding fair use of two different systems would require understanding the systems
themselves. The Continental system, a system built on the Natural Law theory, views
copyright as a natural right, thus fair use is an exception to this theory and must be
construed narrowly. In America, where learning is the purpose of copyright, and the First
Amendment guarantees the right of access to information, fair use exists as a right that
serves the purpose of copyright. With respect to the two extremes of the copyright
balance, fair use weighs stronger in the American system. Whereas, the continental system
takes more regard to protect the author and his moral and economical rights to his work.
These differences reflect on to the nature of fair use in these systems and the fair use
provisions in each law. If the principle of the continental system was an unlimited right to
the author, and fair use was accepted in some cases as a practical necessity, this would not
leave much to say about the nature of fair use in this system but as a defense. In the
United States, fair use derives its nature as an affirmative right straight from the
constitution which states the purpose of copyright and guarantees the right of free speech.
Fair use in the Berne Convention would seem to resemble the continental system although
it leaves much room for legislators of each member country to determine the conditions of
permitting use of copyrighted work.^^° In any case, many conditions that are required by
continental laws for permissible uses, are adopted by the Berne convention. Such
conditions as the publication requirement and the acknowledgment requirement do not
exist in the United States.
"° Art. 9(2) Berne Convention ("It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the
Union to permit the reproduction of such works...") id.
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Remuneration is a concept known to the continental system. This concept serves as a
reimbursement for the authors from uses that cannot be prohibited. To facilitate
application of this concept, continental laws regulate collecting societies that target
manufacturers and importers of recording and copying machines and mediums The
additional cost of this remuneration system is paid eventually by the end-user Thus,
private uses in the continental system are subject to remuneration because the legislators
in these countries presuppose harm to authors from private reproduction. In the United
States, no harm is presumed to authors, but rather harm is but a factor to be considered in
a fair use analysis. ^^' Consequently, no remuneration is due upon using a work in a fair
manner.
The fair use provisions in the continental system are peculiar to that system. A narrow
scope of permissible uses is compatible with a broad moral right. Moral rights of the
author bar a use of an unpublished work for example. Moreover, moral rights will be
given priority if they conflict with a permissible use.''^^
The fair use concept in the United States is peculiar to its American system. Fair use is
broad enough under this system to ensure the interests of the public. A detriment to the
progress of science and useful arts will outweigh a detriment to the economic rights of the
author." The schemes of the continental system of remuneration and such are not
compatible with the American fair use concept. Thus, fair use is a mirror of its system.
To part with this study, I quote the following: "A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a
giant can see farther than the giant himself"""*
' See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
^^' See supra note 3 12 and accompanying text.
'^^ Bernstein, supra note 204, at 38.
"'
Id. at 37.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1 Robert P Merges et al . Intellectual Propenv in the New Technological Age .
(forthcoming \991) (manuscript on file with author)
2 Edward W Ploman & L Clark Hamilton. Copvnght (b^SO)
3. .Alfred C Yen, Restoring the Natural Law Copvnght as labor and Possession. 51 Ohio
St L J 517 (W^O). The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory . 10 Cardoza Arts
6 Entertainment L J 423 (1Q^2).
4. Robert E Hathaway IL American Law Analogues to the Patemitv Element of the
Doctrine of Moral Right: Is the Creative .Artist in America Reallv Protected
\
30
CopvTight L. Symp (ASC.AP) (1983).
5 Phyllis .\mamick, .American Recognition of the Moral Right Issues and Options
.
29
Copyright L. Symp. (ASC.AP) (1983).
6. L. Ray Patterson. Cop\Tight in Historical Perspective (19oS)
7 Stephen M Stewart. International Copvright and Neighboring Rights ( l^'>S3y
8. John Locke, Two Treatises on Cixil Goxernment (lo^X^) (Henr\ Marlcv ed 1S84) (bk
in
9. Francis Hutcheson, .A Short Introduction to Moral Philosopln (P"4), reprinted in
Collected Works (Hildsheim 01ms, 1%9). A Svstem of Moral Philosophy (1''55).
reprinted in Collected Works (Hildsheim: 01ms. 19b9).
10 De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (1625). trans F W Kelsey ("New York Oceana
Publications, 1964).
72
73
11. Craig Joyce et al.. Copyright Law (3rd. ed. 1994).
12. Intellectual Property World Desk Reference: A Guide to Practice by Country, State
and Province (Thomas M. S. Hemnes et al. eds., 1992).
13.6 German Industrial Property, Copyright and Antitrust Laws (Feidrich Karl Beir et al
eds., 2nd ed. 1989).
14. 1 Howard B Abrams, The Law of Copyright (1991).
15. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property , 77 Geo. L. J. 287 (1988).
16. Carol Motyka, U. S. Participation in the Berne Convention and High Technology , 39
Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) (1992).
17. William F. Patry, 1 Copyright Law and Practice (1994).
18. Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works , 2 Studies on Copyright (Arthur Fischer
ed. 1963).
19. 9 Commercial Laws of Europe (Eds. Luis Ten Kate & Neville March Hummings)
(1986).
20. Melville B. Nimmer & Paul Edward Gelle, International Copyright Law and Practice
(1988).
21. Richard A. Bernstein, Parody and Fair Use in Copyright Law , 31 Copyright L. Symp.
(ASCAP) (1984).
22. H. Ball., Law of Copyright and Literary Property (1944).
23. Deborah A. Hartnett, A New Era for Copyright Law: Reconstituting the Fair Use
Doctrine , 39 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) (1992).
24. Michael D. Brittin, Constitutional Fair Use , 28 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) (1982).
74
25. L. Ray Patterson & Judge Stanley F. Birch, Junior, Copyright and Free Speech Rights ,
4 J Intell. Prop. L. 1 (1996).
26. Stephen Freid, Fair Use and the New Act , The Complete Guide to the New Copyright
Law (1977).
27. 3 Boswell's Life of Johnson (G. Hill ed. 1934).
28. H. Desbois, Le Droit d'auteur en France (3rd ed., Paris, 1978).
29 World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971) (1978).
LAW LIBRARY
? u
^Vd
f.
7P/Jfi^
FOR LIBRARY
USE ONLY
